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Summary	
 
Following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 the	 newly	 independent	 countries	 of	 Central	
Asia	undertook	reforms	of	their	agrarian	sectors	with	varying	degrees	of	speed	and	depth.		
In	 general,	 the	 reforms	 consisted	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 land	 tenure	 and	 in	 the	
decentralization	of	irrigation	and	drainage	management.		
	
Through	these	reforms,	former	state	management	institutions	were	abolished	leaving	an	
institutional	 vacuum	 that	 presented	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 development	 of	 local-level	
management	 institutions.	 	However,	 the	historical	context	of	 the	region	poses	particular	
challenges	that	may	impede	users	to	capitalize	on	such	opportunities.			
		
Water	 User’s	 Associations	 or	 the	 local	 administration	 manage	 irrigation	 and	 drainage	
systems	at	the	local	 level.	 	Water	User	Associations	represent	international	donor-driven	
initiatives	 to	 introduce	 equitable,	 democratic	 and	 participative	 institutions	 for	 irrigation	
and	 drainage	 management.	 	 There	 are	 indications	 that	 those	 informal	 institutions	 and	
traditional	modes	of	cooperation	that	survived	the	Soviet	era	are	gaining	importance.	
	
This	study	maps	out	the	various	institutions,	defined	as	"rules	in	use",	that	farmers	employ	
to	manage	the	irrigation	and	drainage	system	in	the	Ferghana	Valley	within	the	context	of	
changing	land	and	water	rights.		The	key	objectives	of	the	study	are	(1)	to	understand	the	
importance	 of	 irrigated	 water	 for	 local	 livelihoods	 in	 the	 research	 area;	 (2)	 to	 explore	
certain	 characteristics	 of	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 institutions	 through	 which	 farmers	
manage	 irrigation	 and	 drainage	 systems;	 and	 (3)	 to	 depict	 ways	 in	 which	 “collective	
action”	in	irrigation	water	management	can	be	strengthened.	
	
The	 methodology	 consists	 of	 a	 synthesis	 of	 existing	 literature	 and	 fieldwork	 in	 the	
Ferghana	Valley	in	Kyrgyzstan,	from	April	30	until	31	July,	2008.	The	results	of	the	research	
are	presented	as	a	case	study.		
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Sommaire	
 
À	la	suite	de	l'effondrement	de	l'Union	soviétique,	les	états	nouvellement	formés	de	l'Asie	
centrale	ont	 entrepris,	 à	 différents	niveaux,	 des	 réformes	de	 leurs	 secteurs	 agraires.	Du	
point	de	 vue	de	 l'utilisation	de	 l'eau	d'irrigation,	 les	 réformes	 consistent	notamment	en	
des	 changements	 aux	 régimes	 fonciers	 et	 dans	 la	 décentralisation	 de	 la	 gestion	 du	
système	de	drainage	et	d'irrigation.	 	
	
La	plupart	des	institutions	qui,	durant	l'époque	soviétique,	géraient	le	système	d'irrigation	
et	 de	 drainage	 ont	 été	 abolies.	 Cela	 a	 créé	 un	 vide	 institutionnel	 et	 permis	 le	
développement	d’institutions	au	niveau	local	qui	puissent	être	participatives	et	appartenir	
aux	utilisateurs.	 Pourtant,	 le	 contexte	historique	et	 contemporain	de	 la	 région	pose	des	
défis	particuliers	pouvant	nuire	à	un	tel	développement.	 	
	
Les	 associations	 d'utilisateurs	 d'eau	 ou	 le	 gouvernement	 local	 gèrent	 l'irrigation	 et	 les	
systèmes	 de	 drainage	 au	 niveau	 local.	 Ces	 associations	 représentent	 souvent	 des	
initiatives	 conduites	 par	 les	 donateurs	 internationaux.	 Parallèlement,	 les	 institutions	
informelles	 et	 les	modes	 traditionnels	de	 coopération	qui	ont	 survécu	à	 l'ère	 soviétique	
deviennent	 importants	 et	 quelques	 institutions	 créées	 durant	 cette	 ère	 demeurent	
toujours	pertinentes.		
	
Cette	recherche	consiste	à	évaluer	le	rôle	d’action	collective	dans	un	système	de	gestion	
d’irrigation	et	de	drainage	dans	le	bassin	versant	de	la	rivière	Syr-Darya	dans	un	contexte	
changeant	 concernant	 les	 droits	 d’usage	 de	 l'eau	 et	 de	 la	 terre.	 L'étude	 cherche	 à	  (1)	
saisir	 l'importance	 de	 l'eau	 d’irrigation	 dans	 les	 moyens	 de	 subsistance	 des	 utilisateurs	
dans	 la	 région	 de	 recherche;	  (2)	 explorer	 certaines	 caractéristiques	 des	 institutions	
formelles	et	informelles	à	travers	lesquelles	les	fermiers	dirigent	des	systèmes	de	drainage	
et	d’irrigation;	et	 (3)	identifier	les	institutions	qui	appuient	l'action	collective	et	celles	qui	
entravant	son	développement.	
	
La	 méthodologie	 de	 recherche	 repose	 une	 revue	 bibliographique	 et	 sur	 un	 travail	 de	
terrain	dans	la	vallée	de	Ferghana,	au	Kirghizistan,	entre	le	30	avril	et	le	31	juillet	2008.	Les	
résultats	de	la	recherche	sont	présentés	comme	une	étude	de	cas.	
	 iii	
	Content	
 
 
 
Summary	................................................................................................................................	i	
Content	..................................................................................................................................	iii	
List	of	figures	and	tables	........................................................................................................	v	
Glossary	.................................................................................................................................	vi	
List	of	abbreviations	.............................................................................................................	vii	
Chapter	1		 Introduction	.....................................................................................................	1	
Chapter	2	 	Conceptual	framework/Literature	review	......................................................	5	
2.1	 Transformations	in	natural	resource	governance	and	management	.........................	5	
2.2	 A	critique	of	irrigation	management	transfer	.............................................................	9	
2.3	 The	role	of	institutions,	organisations	and	property	rights	in	community-level	
resource	management	..............................................................................................	12	
2.4	 The	role	of	collective	action	in	community-level	resource	management	.................	14	
2.5	 Theories	of	collective	action	......................................................................................	16	
2.6	 Formal	and	informal	institutions	in	post-Socialist	countries	.....................................	20	
2.7	 Households	and	livelihoods	.......................................................................................	26	
Chapter	3	 	Research	methods	........................................................................................	28	
3.1	 Research	approach,	data	collection	and	analysis	.....................................................	28	
3.2	 Study	area	..................................................................................................................	34	
3.3	 Limitations	.................................................................................................................	38	
Chapter	4		 The	changing	political	geography	and	its	impact	on	irrigation	management	in	
the	Ferghana	Valley	..................................................................................................	40	
4.1	 Political,	economic	transformations	in	the	Ferghana	Valley	.....................................	40	
4.2	 Institutional	transformations	in	irrigation	management	..........................................	43	
Chapter	5	 	Results,	analysis	and	interpretation	.............................................................	47	
5.1	 Rural	livelihoods	and	household	economics	.............................................................	47	
	 iv	
5.2	 Household	access	to	land	and	irrigation	water	.........................................................	50	
5.3	 Contemporary	institutional	context:	the	emergence	of	formal	and	informal	
institutions	..........................................................................................................................	52	
5.3.1	 Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA:	organisational	structure	and	responsibilities	...............	53	
5.3.2	 Irrigation	water	management	under	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	......................	57	
5.3.3	 Informal	institutions	......................................................................................	63	
Chapter	6		 Conclusions	....................................................................................................	67	
Bibliography	........................................................................................................................	70	
Annex	A:	Interview	guide	....................................................................................................	78	
Annex	B:	Consent	form	.......................................................................................................	83	
	
 
 
 
	 v	
 
List	of	figures	and	tables	
List	of	figures	
Figure	1	 The	research	location	 				35	
Figure	2	 	Issues	related	to	water	in	the	research	area	 	 	 37	
Figure	3	 WUA	organisational	structure		 	 	 	 	 45	
Figure	4	 Diversity	in	crops	in	Zsijde	 	 	 	 	 49	
Figure	5	 Diversity	in	crops	in	Munduz	 	 	 	 	 49	
Figure	6	 Size	of	lands	in	Zsijde	and	Munduz	 	 	 	 51	
Figure	7	 Distribution	infrastructure	at	the	head	of	the	system	 	 56	
	
	
List	of	tables	
Table	1		 	Critical	factors	determining	success	of	common		
property	management	regimes		 	 	 	 	 8	
Table	2	 	 Main	issues	and	aspects	of	inquiry,	and	data	collection		
techniques	 	 	 	 	 	 	 33	
	
 
	 vi	
Glossary	
	
ail	baschi	 Head	of	the	village	
aksakal		 “white	beard”,	Elder	
arenda	 	 Land	owned	and	rented	out	by	the	government	
aryk	 	 Field-level	earth	canal	
ashar	 	 Voluntary	communal	work	
kolkhoz	 Soviet-era	collective	farm,	in	which	member	farmers	owned	the	means	of	
production,	but	not	the	land	
murab	 	 Water	master	
OblVodKhoz	 Province	Basin	Water	Management	Department		
ogorod	 	 Kitchen	garden	
perestroika	 A	policy	or	practice	of	restructuring	or	reforming	a	political	and	economic	
system	
RaiVodKhoz		 District	Department	of	Water	Services		
sotik		 	 Land	measure	(1	hectare	is	100	sotiks)	
sovkhoz	 Soviet-era	agricultural	enterprise	owned	and	operated	by	the	state	
subbotnik	 Forced	collective	labour	
ülüs	 	Small	landholdings	that	received	for	99	years,	due	to	the	land	
redistribution	
  
	 vii	
 
 
List	of	abbreviations	
 
I&D	 	 Irrigation	and	drainage	
IMT	 	 Irrigation	management	transfer	
IWMR	 	 Integrated	water	resource	management		
O&M	 	 Operation	and	maintenance		
PIM	 	 Participatory	irrigation	management		
UNEP	 	 United	Nations	Environmental	Programme	
WUA	 	 Water	User	Association	
WUG	 	 Water	User	Groups	
	 1	
Chapter	1		 Introduction	
 
Irrigation	 Management	 Transfer	 (“IMT”)	 is	 a	 broad	 concept	 that	 is	 used	 to	 define	 the	
process	 whereby	 the	 responsibility	 and	 authority	 for	 the	 on-farm	 management	 of	
irrigation	 schemes	 is	 transferred	 from	 government	 agencies	 to	 user	 organisation	 or	
private-sector	entities.		Since	the	concept	was	first	popularized	in	the	1960s,	more	than	57	
countries	have	implemented	irrigation	sector	reforms	of	which	IMT	forms	a	part.		
	
Kyrgyzstan	 is	 among	 those	 countries.	 	 Since	 it	 gained	 its	 independence	 from	 the	 Soviet	
Union	 in	 1991,	 several	 far-reaching	 changes	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector.		
Agriculture	 itself	 has	 changed	 from	 a	 revenue-generating	 sector	 to	 one	 of	 the	 survival	
strategies	of	each	rural	household.		The	agricultural	units	of	the	Soviet	era,	the	kolkhoz	and	
sovkhoz	 have	been	abolished	 and	 comprehensive	 land	 redistribution	 took	place,	 creating	
millions	of	 small	 landowners.	 	 The	 same	 irrigation	 system	 that	used	 to	 serve	 the	kolkhoz	
and	 sovkhoz	 of	 various	 sizes	 now	delivers	water	 to	millions	of	 small	 landholders.	 	While,	
during	 the	 Soviet	 administration,	 cotton	 was	 the	 main	 crop,	 today	 farmers	 are	 free	 to	
decide	 what	 crops	 they	 grow.	 	 All	 these	 factors	 challenge	 irrigation	 water	 use	 and	
management.		
	
In	 Kyrgyzstan,	 much	 like	 in	 other	 countries	 that	 implemented	 IMT,	 it	 is	 promoted	 and	
supported	 by	 donors	 as	 a	 way	 to	 open	 new	 frontiers	 for	 millions	 of	 new	 independent	
landholders	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 management	 of	 their	 own	 irrigation	 systems:	 an	 idea	
inspired	by	 the	 images	of	 long-enduring	 traditional	 self-governed	 irrigation	systems.	 	 IMT	
also	 means	 that	 irrigation	 departments	 would	 no	 longer	 have	 to	 shoulder	 the	 costs	
associated	with	 the	operation	and	maintenance	 (“O&M”)	of	 secondary	and	 tertiary	 canal	
systems.		Rather,	farmers	would	pay	those	costs	in	the	form	of	water	fees.		
	
It	 has	 been	 well	 established	 that	 the	 management	 of	 such	 common-pool	 resources	 as	
irrigation	water	 requires	collective	action.	 	However,	developing	 institutions	 for	collective	
action	 faces	 various	 challenges.	 	 Some	of	 these	 challenges	 are	 particular	 to	 Central	 Asia,	
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including	 Kyrgyzstan.	 	 First,	 throughout	 the	 20th	 century,	 Central	 Asia	 has	 mainly	
experienced	 centralized	and	hierarchically	organized	management	of	 its	water	 resources.		
Although	collective	work	formed	the	basis	of	the	Soviet-era	kolkhoz,	it	was	compulsory	and	
therefore	not	comparable	to	the	voluntary	collective	action	that	 is	required	for	successful	
IMT.		Mearns	(1996a)	points	to	this	dilemma	when	he	writes	that,	in	Central	Asia,	collective	
action	is	more	often	than	not	associated	with	the	failed	experience	of	collectivisation	and	
compulsory	collective	work.		Yet,	members	of	newly-established	Water	Users	Associations	
(“WUAs”)	 are	 expected	 to	 collaborate	with	 each	other	 and	with	 government	 agencies	 to	
collectively	manage	 system	maintenance,	 ensure	 effective,	 fair	 and	 timely	 distribution	of	
water	 between	 farms,	 collect	 payments	 and	 settle	 small	 disputes	 (The	 Law	 Library	 of	
Congress	2015).		
	
An	 equally	 significant	 challenge	 is	 developing	 the	 managerial	 capacities	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	
government	to	co-manage	irrigation	water	with	the	WUAs.	 	Functions	and	responsibilities	
are	 divided	 between	 government	 line	 departments,	 local	 government	 agencies	 and	 the	
users	 themselves	 grouped	 in	 WUAs.	 	 Sustainable	 management	 of	 the	 irrigation	 system	
depends	as	much	on	 the	user-agency	 relationship	as	 it	depends	on	 the	status	of	physical	
infrastructure.	 	 Currently,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 have	 the	 financial	 and	 institutional	
capacity	to	wholly	manage	or	co-manage	the	irrigation	schemes	on	its	territory.		It	is	unable	
to	collect	all	 irrigation	fees	and	there	tend	to	be	deferred	maintenance	of	the	system	due	
to	a	 lack	of	 funds.	 	An	added	challenge	 for	 the	agencies	 is	 to	manage	the	politics	around	
sharing	 irrigation	water:	while	previously	water	was	supplied	via	a	regional	canal	network	
to	 an	 agricultural	 system	 that	 functioned	 as	 a	whole,	 today	 borders	 divide	 the	 irrigation	
system,	giving	birth	to	shortages	and	countless	disputes	over	surface	water	flows	between	
the	countries	in	the	region	and	between	cross-border	communities.		
	
These	dilemmas	that	arise	from	the	recent	history	of	the	region	and	from	the	far-reaching	
changes	 that	 have	 occurred	 since	 independence	 inspired	 the	 present	 inquiry	 into	
contemporary	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	 the	 Ferghana	 Valley	 in	 Kyrgyzstan.	 	 This	
thesis	explores,	through	a	case	study,	collective	action	in	institutions	of	local-level	irrigation	
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management	 in	 the	upper	Syr	Darya	River	basin.	 	 It	 sets	out	 to	provide	an	answer	 to	 the	
following	research	question:		
What	role	does	collective	action	play	in	the	initiation	and	the	practicing	of	local-
level	 irrigation	and	drainage	management	 institutions	 in	 the	Ferghana	Valley	of	
Kyrgyzstan	and	how	does	it	work?	
Secondary	research	questions	are:	
What	is	the	importance	of	irrigation	water	to	livelihoods	in	the	current	context?	
How	did	the	local	institutional	context	change	during	the	transitional	period?	
What	 kind	 of	water	management	 institutions	 (formal	 and	 informal)	 do	 current	
land	and	water	rights	generate	at	the	local	scale?		
	
The	 fieldwork	 took	place	 in	 two	communities	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	Ferghana	Valley,	 in	 the	upper	
Syr	 Darya	 River	 basin,	 over	 three	months,	 in	 the	 Summer	 of	 2008.	 	 The	 location	 of	 the	
research	 is	 described	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 3	 under	 Section	 3.2	 and	 is	 shown	 on	
Figure	1.		
	
The	Kyrgyz	Ferghana	Valley	was	chosen	as	 the	 location	of	 the	research	due	to	 its	historic	
and	 contemporary	 importance	 as	 the	 breadbasket	 of	 Central	 Asia,	 and	 to	 the	 natural	
resource	management	issues	that	inflict	the	region	due	to	the	scarcity	of	arable	land	and	to	
the	density	of	the	population.		The	Ferghana	Valley	has	a	semi-arid	climate	and	agriculture	
and	 livelihoods	are	dominated	by	 irrigation.	 	 Some	45%	of	 the	 irrigation	areas	 of	 the	Syr	
Darya	basin	are	located	in	the	valley	(UNEP	2005).		There	is	a	long	history	of	irrigation	and	
both	the	agrarian	sector	and	irrigation	has	continued	to	undergo	significant	changes	since	
independence	and	until	today.		At	the	time	of	the	fieldwork,	of	the	three	countries	located	
in	 the	 Ferghana	Valley	 -	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Tajikistan	 and	Uzbekistan	 -	 devolution	was	 the	most	
advanced	 in	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Ferghana.	 	 Here,	 the	 agricultural	 and	 land	 reforms	 designed	 to	
boost	output	and	diversify	agricultural	production	necessitated	various	new	 legal	 regimes	
and	 implementing	 institutions	 for	 accessing	 land	 and	 regulating	water	management	 at	 a	
local	 level	 (UNEP	 2005).	 	 The	 restructuring	 of	water	management	 included	 handing	 over	
greater	use	and	management	responsibilities	over	the	irrigation	system	to	users	organized	
into	WUAs.		
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To	answer	the	research	questions,	a	desk	review	of	the	available	literature	has	been	carried	
out	prior	to	the	fieldwork.	 	The	data	from	the	field	was	collected	through	interviews	with	
farmers	 and	 officials	 and	 through	 participant	 observation	 over	 three	months	 in	 the	 field	
during	the	irrigation	season.		The	findings	are	presented	in	the	framework	of	a	case	study.		
	
The	thesis	is	organized	as	follows:	
Chapter	 2	 introduces	 IMT	 and	 defines	 the	 principle	 concepts	 in	 this	 research:	 rights,	
institutions	and	collective	action.		Based	on	the	available	academic	literature,	this	chapter	
explores	the	linkages	between	these	concepts.		It	then	elaborates	on	the	various	forms	that	
collective	 action	 can	 take	 in	 natural	 resource	 management,	 including	 its	 linkages	 with	
agricultural	land-	and	irrigation	water-use	and	livelihoods.		
Chapter	 3	 describes	 the	 methodology	 of	 the	 research	 project	 from	 the	 design	 stage	
through	the	fieldwork	to	the	analysis.		A	reflection	on	the	various	aspects	of	the	fieldwork	is	
undertaken	 and	 opportunities	 and	 limitations	 encountered	 during	 the	 research	 are	
elaborated	upon.		The	research	location	is	described	in	detail.		
Chapter	4	describes	how	irrigation	systems	and	their	management	in	the	Ferghana	evolved	
during	the	Tsarist	and	Soviet	periods.		The	discussion	then	moves	on	to	explaining	changes	
in	 the	 management	 of	 the	 irrigation	 and	 drainage	 system	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 since	 its	
independence	in	1991	until	the	present,	and	the	impacts	of	that	change	on	land	and	water	
rights	and	on	institutions.		
In	Chapter	5,	rural	livelihoods	and	the	ways	in	which	rural	livelihoods	are	impacted	by	post-
independence	 transformations,	 specifically	 in	 irrigation	water	management,	are	explored.		
Based	on	 the	 findings	of	 the	 fieldwork,	 formal	and	 informal	organizations	are	 introduced	
and	 their	 role	 and	 practices,	 including	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 inspire	 collective	 action	 is	
explained.		The	analysis	is	presented	in	the	form	of	a	case	study	of	collective	action	among	
users	whose	lands	are	serviced	by	the	WUAs.	
Chapter	6	synthesizes	issues	brought	up	throughout	the	thesis.	 	 It	returns	to	the	research	
questions:	 the	 nature,	 characteristics,	 limits	 and	 possibilities	 of	 local	 governance	
institutions	and	organisations	for	managing	irrigation	water.		
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Chapter	2	 Conceptual	framework/Literature	review	
 
2.1 Transformations	in	natural	resource	governance	and	
management	
 
From	 the	 second	part	of	 the	20th	 century,	 governments,	 international	 organisations	 and	
NGOs	 have	 increasingly	 promoted	 the	 transfer	 of	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 for	 the	
management	of	such	common-pool	resources,	also	called	the	commons,	such	as	irrigation	
water,	 forestry,	 fisheries,	 wildlife	 and	 rangelands,	 to	 lower	 levels	 of	 government	 or	
directly	to	the	users.		Developed	countries	implemented	many	such	policies	from	the	1950	
to	the	1970s,	and	developing	countries	followed	suit	in	the	1980s	and	1990’s	(Fujita	et	al.	
no	 date).	 	 In	 irrigation	 water	 management,	 devolution,	 also	 called	 IMT,	 reduced,	 and	
sometimes	eliminated,	the	role	of	government	institutions	in	operation	and	maintenance	
(“O&M),	 the	collection	of	water	duties,	 the	distribution	of	water	and	conflict	 resolution,	
and	delegated	 those	 roles	 to	 local-level	organisations,	 such	as	water	users’	or	 irrigators’	
associations	(Ghate	et	al.	2008).			
	
Decentralization	 and	 devolution	 are	 but	 the	 latest	 in	 a	 series	 of	 shifts	 that	 have	
characterized	water	resources	management	throughout	the	world	in	general	and	in	Central	
Asia	in	particular	(Allan	2006).		In	Central	Asia,	as	elsewhere	in	semi-arid	regions,	the	pre-
industrial	 era	was	 characterized	 by	 decentralized	 and	 small-scale	 irrigated	 cultivation	 for	
subsistence.		The	shift	to	a	“hydraulic	mission”,	began	in	the	1930s	with	the	collectivisation	
of	lands	and	the	development	of	large-scale	irrigation	systems	by	the	Soviets	in	an	attempt	
to	 turn	 the	 desert	 into	 a	 cotton-growing	 region.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 Gorbachev’s	 policy	 of	
perestroika	 that	 made	 the	 development	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 a	 preoccupation	 with	
environmental	issues	(such	as	the	drying	up	of	the	Aral	Sea),	possible,	the	hydraulic	mission	
was	replaced	by	a	policy	that	was	more	concerned	about	environmental	sustainability.		The	
objective	of	development	at	 this	 time	was	to	 improve	economic	performance	and	newly-
independent	 governments	 began	 sectoral	 reforms,	 including	 land	 privatisation	 and	 the	
introduction	 of	 water	 duties.	 	 The	 latest	 step	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 policies	 in	 irrigation	
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management	is	the	promotion	by	international	development	agencies	of	Integrated	Water	
Resource	 Management	 (“IWRM”),	 IMT	 and	 Participatory	 Irrigation	 Management	 (“PIM”)	
(Abdullaev	et	al.	2008).		
	
Devolution	 and	decentralisation	policies,	 such	 as	 IMT	and	PIM,	 represent	 a	 great	 change	
from	 earlier	 policy	 that	 considered	 local	 communities	 obstacles	 to	 efficient	 resource	
management.		That	stand	is	perhaps	best	exemplified	by	the	policies	that	were	introduced	
as	a	result	of	Hardin’s	“The	Tragedy	of	the	Commons”.		In	his	article,	Hardin	explains	how	
“ancient”	 ethics	 by	 which	 people	 traditionally	 showed	 restraint	 in	 using	 their	 natural	
resources	 are	 poorly	 suited	 for	 governing	 the	 commons	 in	 a	 “complex,	 crowded,	
changeable	 world”	 (1968:	 p.	 25).	 	 He	 suggested	 that	 the	 users	 of	 the	 resource	 would	
deplete	the	resources	in	the	absence	of	governance	by	a	higher	authority.		His	ideas	greatly	
influenced	the	forms	of	ownership	and	governance	of	common	resources	from	the	time	of	
his	writing	until	very	recently.		
	
Just	as	the	failure,	 in	the	past	decades,	of	central	management	of	the	commons	(Agrawal	
1999;	Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999)	to	enforce	management	rules	in	rangeland	and	forest	
use	and	constantly	changing	irrigation	flows	has	become	obvious,	it	also	become	clear	that	
Hardin’s	theory	is	simplistic	and	too	deterministic	(Feeney	et	al.	1990).		According	to	critics,	
Hardin,	in	his	demonstration	of	the	failure	of	common-pool	resource	management,	did	not	
take	into	consideration	the	capacity	of	users	to	regulate	resource	use	through	institutions	
of	collective	action	and,	 in	 fact,	he	demonstrated	the	 failure	of	open	access	 resource	use	
rather	 than	 that	 of	 the	 “commons”	 (Theesfeld	 2004).	 	 Appell	 (1993)	 also	 argues	 that	
Hardin,	 in	his	work	on	the	“commons”,	did	not	take	 into	account	the	“emergent	and	self-
regulating	nature	of	social	organizations”.		In	fact,	people	are	social	beings	and	are	capable	
of	 cooperation	 and	 solidarity.	 	 Another	 critique	 is	 that	 Hardin,	 in	 his	 theory,	 does	 not	
inquire	 into	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 social	 entity	 that	 hold	 rights	 to	 the	 resource,	 about	 the	
nature	 of	 that	 entity	 and	 the	 rights	 and	 powers	 it	 has	 over	 the	 resource.	 	 According	 to	
Appell	 (1993)	 “the	 argument	 of	 Hardin’s	 critics,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 political	 philosophers	
interested	in	distributive	justice,	are	faulty	in	one	key	aspect,	which	they	share	with	Hardin.		
They	 fail	 to	 consider	 two	 basic	 problems:	 the	 locus	 of	 property	 rights,	 i.e.,	 who	 are	 the	
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holders	 of	 the	 rights,	 and	 who,	 on	 the	 system	 of	 property	 relations,	 are	 responsible	 for	
managing	the	rights”	(p.	9).	
	
In	 her	 work	 on	 common	 pool	 resources,	 Ostrom	 (1990)	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 that	
communities	 are	 able	 to	 design	 rules	 and	 institutions,	 and	 through,	 them	 manage	
resources	sustainably.		In	her	study	of	examples	of	common	pool	resource	management	by	
communities,	Ostrom	(1990)	identified	a	number	of	conditions	which	are	necessary	for	the	
sustained	use	and	management	of	these	resources	by	a	community	of	users.		According	to	
her	 research,	 the	most	 significant	 conditions	 are	 that	 the	 law	 regarding	 access	 and	 user	
rights	and	the	mechanisms	for	conflict	resolution	must	be	local,	clear,	public,	known	to	and	
accessible	by	all	users.		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 another	 paradigm	 that	 championed	 the	 role	 of	 user	 communities	 in	
resources	management	emerged.		Supporters	of	communities	as	resource	managers	argue	
that	 users	 of	 a	 resource,	 given	 that	 they	 are	 empowered	 as	 a	 group	 to	 take	 over	
management	 of	 the	 resource,	 have	 the	 incentive	 to	 manage	 it	 more	 efficiently	 and	
sustainably	than	does	the	government.		It	is	suggested	that	the	capacity	of	a	community	or	
group	 of	 users	 to	 manage	 a	 resource	 in	 a	 sustainable	 manner	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 its	
intimate	 knowledge	 of	 the	 resource.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 fact	 that	 members’	 livelihoods	
depend	on	the	resource	will	provide	a	strong	incentive	to	maintain	the	resource	over	time	
(Meinzen-Dick	 and	 Knox	 1999).	 	 These	 ideas	 emerged	 from	 various	 scholarly	 studies	 of	
small-scale	 and	 long-enduring	 traditional	 irrigation	 systems,	 where	 users	 are	 able	 “…to	
construct	and	enforce	rules	and	norms	that	constrain	the	behaviour	of	individuals”	(Feeney	
et	al.	1990:	p.	63).		
	
Based	on	the	work	by	Ostrom	(1990)	and	Baland	and	Platteau	(1996),	Agrawal	(2001)	has	
come	up	with	and	added	to	a	comprehensive	list	of	critical	factors	that	ensure	sustainable	
use	 of	 the	 common	 pool	 resources	 (Table	 1).	 	 The	 six	 main	 categories	 are	 (i)	 resource	
characteristics;	 (ii)	 group	 characteristics;	 (iii)	 institutional	 arrangements;	 (iv)	 external	
environment;	 (v)	 relationship	 between	 resource	 and	 group	 characteristics	 and	 (vi)	
relationship	 between	 resource	 system	 and	 institutional	 arrangements.	 	 Each	 of	 these	
categories	encompass	a	number	of	factors	the	presence	or	absence	of	which	influence	the	
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governance	of	the	commons.		Each	of	these	factors	may	influence	the	success	or	failure	of	
common	 pool	 resource	management	 regimes.	 	Mukherji	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 note	 that	 a	 large	
number	of	 factors	 influence	common-pool	 resource	management	and	 that	 these	 factors	
and	 the	 interaction	 between	 them	 may	 also	 impede	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 overall	
theory	on	the	successful	management	of	common	pool	resources.		
	
Table	1		Critical	factors	determining	success	of	common	property	management	regimes		
1.	Resource	system	characteristics		
(i)	Small	size		
(ii)	Well	defined	boundaries		
(iii)	Low	levels	of	mobility		
(iv)	Possibilities	of	storage	of	the	benefits	of	the	resource		
(v)	Predictability	
2.	Group	characteristics		
(i)	Small	size		
(ii)	Clearly	defined	boundaries		
(iii)	Shared	norms		
(iv)	Past	successful	experiences	and	social	capital		
(v)	Appropriate	leadership		
(vi)	Interdependence	among	members		
(vii)	Heterogeneity	of	endowments,	homogeneity	of	identities	and	interests		
(viii)	Low	levels	of	poverty	
3.	Institutional	arrangements		
(i)	Rule	are	simple	and	easy	to	understand		
(ii)	Locally	devised	access	and	management	rules		
(iii)	Ease	in	rule	enforcement		
(iv)	Graduated	sanctions		
(v)	Availability	of	low	cost	adjudication		
(vi)	Accountability	of	managers	to	the	users		
4.	External	environment		
(i)	Technology:	low	cost	exclusion	technology	and	ease	of	adoption		
(ii)	Low	levels	of	interaction	with	outside	markets	and	gradual	change	in	interaction	with	outside	
markets		
(iii)	State:	governments	not	to	undermine	local	authority,	supportive	external	sanction	
mechanisms,	appropriate	external	aid	if	needed	and	nested	governance	at	different	sociopolitical	
levels.	
5.	Relationship	between	resource	and	group	characteristics		
(i)	Overlap	between	resource	domain	and	rights	domain		
(ii)	High	dependence	on	the	resource	(iii)	Perceived	fairness	in	allocation	of	benefits		
(iv)	Low	levels	of	user	demand		
(v)	Gradual	change	in	levels	of	demand	
6.	Relationship	between	resource	system	and	institutional	arrangements		
(i)	Match	extractible	quantity	with	its	regeneration	capacity	
Source:	Adapted	from	Agrawal	(2001):1659	and	based	on	Ostrom	(1990)	and	Baland	and	Platteau	
(1996).		
 
	 9	
2.2 A	critique	of	irrigation	management	transfer	
 
IMT	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 desire	 by	 governments	 and	 donors	 to	make	 irrigated	
agriculture,	an	enormous	user	of	freshwater	resources,	more	efficient.		Its	appearance	was	
based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 assumptions	 similar	 to	 those	 related	 to	 other	 common-pool	
resources.		An	analogy	was	drawn	between	communities	that	were	to	become	managers	of	
irrigation	systems	and	users	of	traditional	irrigation	systems.		Communities	were	thought	of	
as	cohesive,	having	a	great	 inherent	capacity	for	collective	action	that	they	would	rally	to	
create.		They	would	implement	and	enforce	collective	rules	that	ensure	organisational	and	
environmental	 sustainability	 and	efficient	use.	 	 It	was	assumed	 that	 increased	ownership	
and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 resource	 by	 users	 and	 increased	 involvement	 and	 decision-
making	powers	 for	 them	would	 create	a	 commitment	 to	use	 the	 resource	efficiently	and	
sustainably.	 	The	fact	that	users	themselves	pay	for	the	cost	of	O&M	would	 increase	that	
commitment.	 	 The	 principle	 that	 these	 objectives	 are	 based	 on	 is	 called	 the	 principle	 of	
subsidiarity,	meaning	that	“decisions	are	made	the	lowest	level	possible”	(Garces-Restrepo	
et	al.	2007).			
	
IMT	 is	 not	without	 its	 critics.	 	 Hunt	 (1989)	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 point	 out	 its	 faults	 by	
drawing	an	analogy	between	the	capacity	of	users	of	modern	irrigation	systems	to	manage	
those	systems	with	managers	of	 traditional	 systems.	 	He	argues	 that	 traditional	 irrigation	
communities	 are	 “highly	 integrated	 systems”	and	 that	most	WUAs,	due	 to	 their	 differing	
organisational	structures,	may	bear	little	resemblance	to	them	in	terms	of	land	and	water	
rights,	bureaucratic	structure	and	group	membership	(Hunt	1989).		
	
Moreover,	 community	 cohesion	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 	 The	 power	 relations	
between	 different	 groups	 of	 people	 in	 society	 is	 expressed	 in	 many	 ways,	 for	 example	
gender	relations	(what	behaviour	is	acceptable	for	men	and	women),	age	(how	the	old	and	
young	 are	 regarded	 and	 treated),	 class	 (how	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 status	 of	 different	
groups	 is	 generally	 understood)	 or	 caste	 (the	 various	 restrictions	 surrounding	 caste	 that	
influence	 what	 people	 of	 different	 caste	 groups	 can	 and	 cannot	 do	 to	 change	 their	
livelihoods)	 (Messer	 and	 Townsley	 2003).	 	 The	 powers	 that	 are	 gained	 through	 the	
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decentralization	process,	which,	in	this	case,	are	the	rights	to	manage	Irrigation	&	Drainage	
(“I&D”)	 systems	 through	 local	 institutions,	 are	 negotiated	 in	 a	 social	 environment	 that	 is	
crosscut	by	those	“multiple	axes	of	differentiation”	(Agrawal	and	Gibson	1999).		Differences	
in	social	status	may	create	conflicting	powers	and	values	in	the	way	in	which	people	think	
about	 the	 management	 of	 resources,	 and	 these	 values	 will	 strongly	 influence	 users’	
incentives	 and	 opportunities	 to	 participate	 effectively	 in	 decision-making	 (Cleaver	 and	
Franks	2005).	
	
Questions	 regarding	 the	 supposed	 objectives	 and	 beneficiaries	 of	 IMT	 also	 arise.	 	 In	 the	
midst	 of	 the	 general	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 democratisation	 (participatory	 management)	
aspects	 of	 IMT,	 few	 studies	 inquire	 into	 the	 politics	 behind	 management	 transfer.		
Suhardiman	(2008)	points	out	that	the	first	IMT	policy	formulation	originated	from	a	desire	
by	international	donors	and	governments	to	reduce	public	spending	on	irrigation	systems.		
With	 IMT,	 donors	 (who	 are	 frequently	 behind	 IMT/PIM),	 and	 governments,	 wished	 to	
achieve	 financial	 autonomy	 of	 irrigation	 systems	 through	 the	 recovery	 of	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 costs	 from	 users	 and	 by	 users’	 organisations.	 	 Thus	 IMT	 was	 first	 and	
foremost	an	economic	policy	that	aims	at	privatising	public	irrigation	systems.		It	was	only	
later,	in	the	1990s,	and	only	then	as	an	afterthought,	that	IMT	policy	was	linked	with	ideas	
about	 democratisation	 and	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 management.	 	 Suhardiman	 (2008)	
concludes	that	the	real	motivation	for	IMT	is	difficult	to	assess:	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	
main	role	of	the	farmers’	organisation	is	to	recover	costs	or	to	represent	farmers’	needs.		
	
As	for	the	farmers,	the	actual	“beneficiaries”	of	IMT,	there	is	no	evidence	that	they	have	a	
choice	 in	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 accept	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 the	 authority	 for	 the	
management	of	 the	 system.	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 frequently	assumed	 that	 farmers	are	 ready	and	
willing	 to	 take	 over	 water	 management.	 	 After	 all,	 who	 would	 refuse	 such	 powers?		
However,	 the	 capacity	 to	manage	 is	 rarely	 as	 simple	 as	 forming	WUAs	and	handing	over	
management	responsibilities	to	them.		After	handover,	farmer	organisations	must	manage	
the	 physical,	 technical	 and	 social	 aspects	 of	 the	 system,	 tasks	 that	 require	 specialized	
knowledge.	 	Users	must	develop	certain	capacities	 to	manage	complex	 irrigation	systems	
because	there	 is	no	evidence	that	 they,	 just	by	being	users,	possess	 the	same	knowledge	
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about	 their	 system	 as	 users	 of	 small-scale	 traditional	 systems	 (Suhardiman	 2008).	 	 A	
pointer	 to	 this	potential	 lack	of	capacity	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	modern	 irrigation	systems	of	
the	1960s	and	1970s	were	designed	without	user	participation	and	contribution.		
	
The	 issue	 of	 user	 participation	 suggests	 that	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 commonly	 termed	 PIM	
should	 be	 considered.	 	 PIM	 is	 a	 process	 whereby	 users	 become	 participants	 in	 the	
management	 of	 O&M.	 	 PIM	 is	 frequently	 used	 to	 achieve	 IMT,	 especially	 at	 the	 co-
management	phase	of	IMT,	when	the	management	of	the	system	is	shared	between	the	
public	sector	agencies	and	some	entity	 that	represents	the	users	 (Garces-Restrepo	et	al.	
2007).		IMT	and	PIM	are	frequently	used	interchangeably	resulting	in	unclear	assumptions	
about	the	ultimate	objectives	of	IMT.		
	
The	 management	 organisation	 that	 is	 created	 during	 the	 IMT	 process	 and	 to	 which	
responsibilities	for	the	management	of	irrigation	system	are	transferred	is,	by	its	nature,	a	
participative	 organisation.	 	 Users	 choose	 their	 representatives	 whose	 duty	 becomes	 to	
represent	 them.	 	Representatives	must	also	be	accountable	 to	 the	users.	 	Participation	 is	
also	accomplished	in	other	ways,	notably	though	communal	work,	and	on	a	smaller	scale,	
through	taking	turns	and	monitoring.		
	
Regarding	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 farmer	 in	 the	management	 of	 O&M,	 the	 view	 in	 this	
paper	is	taken	that	participation	is	necessary	(for	the	reasons	given	above),	but	that	various	
degrees	of	participation	are	possible.		While	in	Mexico	farmers	are	involved	less	directly	in	
the	management	of	irrigation	and	that	task	is	contracted	to	private	entities,	in	the	Central	
Asian	 context,	 farmers	 are	 expected	 to	 contribute	 directly	 to	 irrigation	management.	 	 In	
this	 context	 of	 Central	 Asia,	 participation	 through	 collective	 action	 is	 desirable	 because	
farmers	are	unable	to	pay	high	fees	for	contractors	and	are	more	likely	to	invest	their	own	
time	and	energy	in	monitoring	and	maintenance	work.		In	this	thesis	the	view	is	that	farmer	
participation	 is	 not	 an	 end	 in	 itself	 but	 a	 way	 to	 improve	 the	 production	 of	 crops	 and	
agricultural	incomes.		
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This	 section	 has	 provided	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 complexities	 of	 IMT	 and	 the	 various	
assumptions	 behind	 it.	 	 Next,	 the	major	 concepts	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 this	 research	 are	
explained.	
2.3	 The	role	of	institutions,	organisations	and	property	rights	
in	community-level	resource	management	
 
At	the	heart	of	IMT	is	the	capacity	of	farmer	organisations	to	manage	irrigation	systems.		At	
the	heart	of	the	management	are	institutions.		Institutions,	or	rules	in	use,	encompass	the	
different	 levels	of	management	 in	a	 resource	management	system,	down	to	 the	 farmers’	
level.	 	 They	 may	 be	 formal	 or	 informal.	 	 Leach	 et	 al.	 (1999),	 define	 institutions	 as	
“regularized	patterns	of	behavior	that	emerge	from	underlying	structures	or	sets	of	“rules	in	
use”	communities	or	societies	adopt	to	govern	user	behaviour	and	which	are	practiced	over	
time”	(p.	237).		Formal	rules,	such	as	those	embodied	by	WUAs,	have	explicit	organisational	
structures	and	a	legal	framework.		Informal	rules	encompass	the	traditions,	norms	as	well	
as	 groups	 and	 organisations	 that	 “influence	 who	 has	 access	 to	 and	 control	 over	 what	
resources	 and	 arbitrate	 contested	 resource	 claims”	 (p.	 226).	 	 Formal	 or	 bureaucratic	
institutions	exemplify	how	the	system	ought	 to	work	and	partly	determine	 the	strategies	
that	 households	 employ	 to	make	 use	 of	 the	 resources	 that	 are	 accessible	 to	 them.	 	 For	
example,	 policies	 for	 giving	more	 responsibility	 to	 village-level	 institutions	may	 give	 local	
people	more	influence	over	the	decisions	that	affect	them	directly.		Formal	institutions	are	
“visible”	in	the	sense	that	they	have	formal	and	clearly	defined	rules,	while	informal	ones	
tend	 to	 be	 “opaque”	 and	 therefore	 harder	 to	 recognize.	 	 Contrary	 to	 formal	 or	 “visible”	
institutions	that	are	often	imposed	from	outside,	“invisible”	or	informal	institutions	tend	to	
emerge	 from	 long-standing	 practices	 by	 members	 of	 societies	 and	 are	 embedded	 in	 a	
certain	 socio-cultural	 context.	 	 While	 formal	 institutions	 tend	 to	 be	 “rigid”	 structures,	
informal	institutions	are	established	and	practiced	in	response	to	certain	situations	that	the	
users	face.		They	therefore,	maybe	constantly	adapted	to	changing	circumstances	and	the	
roles	that	people	play	in	such	institutions	may	also	change	from	time	to	time	(Messer	and	
Townsley	2003).		While	formal	organisations	are	often	established	to	serve	a	sole	purpose	
(for	example	the	purpose	of	the	WUAs	is	to	manage	irrigation	water),	informal	institutions	
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are	 frequently	 a	 product	 of	 long-existing	 customs	 and	 practices	 in	 relation	 to	 various	
aspects	of	life,	among	which	irrigation	management	is	but	one.		
	
Organisations	are	strongly	related	to	institutions.	 	Leach	et	al.	 (1999)	define	organisations	
as	“groups	of	 individuals	bound	together	by	some	common	purpose	to	achieve	objectives”	
(p.	 237).	 	 Organisations	 exist	 because	 of	 a	 set	 of	 formal	 rules	 give	 them	 meaning.		
Institutions	may	or	may	not	have	organisational	manifestations	(Leach	et	al.	1999).		When	
they	 do,	 these	 provide	 arenas	 within	 which	 people	 interact	 and	 therefore	 they	 are	
important	 elements	 of	 institution	 building.	 	 Such	 arenas	may	 exist	 in	 the	 form	of	 formal	
organisations	(such	as	the	WUA)	and	informal	organisations	(such	as	the	Elders’	Council).			
	
According	to	Vermillion	(2001),	Schlager	and	Ostrom	(1992),	Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	(1999)	
and	 Schlager	 (2005),	 a	 fundamental	 factor	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 collective	 action	 is	 the	
existence	of	property	 rights.	 	 By	property	 rights	 governments	provide	assurance	 to	users	
that	 their	 access	 to	 the	 resource	 is	 guaranteed	 in	 the	 short	 term	 and	 into	 the	 future.		
Collective	 action	 and	 property	 rights	 are	 strongly	 linked:	 de	 jure	 and	 de	 facto	 property	
rights	 will	 influence	 the	ways	 in	 which	 users	 assert	 claims	 to	 the	 resources	 by	 investing	
collectively	 into	 the	 protection	 of	 ownership	 rights	 (regulating	 access),	 operating	 the	
resource	and	organizing	repair.			
	
In	 terms	of	 rights	 to	 irrigation	water,	Vermillion	 (2001)	 suggests	 that	 the	 following	 rights	
may	be	devolved	to	communities	(fully,	or	in	co-management	with	the	government):		
• water	right	-	the	right	(of	the	WUA	and	individual	users)	to	distribute	the	resource	
from	the	point	of	distribution	to	individual	farmers;		
• right	to	determine	crop	and	the	method	of	cultivation	–	the	right	to	practice	local	
knowledge;	
• right	to	protect	against	land	conversion;		
• infrastructure	 use	 rights	 –	 the	 right	 to	 operate,	 repair,	 modify	 or	 eliminate	
structures.”	
	
Other	organisational	rights	consist	of	the	rights	of	the	association	“to	mobilize	and	manage	
finances	and	other	resources”,	including	human	resources,	to	accomplish	certain	works,	to	
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determine	“its	mission	and	scope	of	activities”	and	impose	rules	and	sanctions,	to	establish	
the	 right	 to	 membership	 of	 users	 in	 the	 organisation	 as	 well	 as	 excluding	 members,	 to	
contract	 outside	 parties	 for	 those	works	 related	 to	 operation	 and	maintenance	 that	 the	
association	 is	 not	willing	 or	 cannot	 undertake	 and	 to	 access	 support	 services	 (Vermillion	
2001).	
	
Rights	 that	users	can	 receive	 (or	create,	depending	on	 the	 level	of	privatization)	can	vary	
from	only	access	rights	(for	example	entering	a	national	park)	to	full-scale	ownership	rights,	
which	include	all	of	the	rights	mentioned	above.		These	various	kinds	of	rights	overlap	and	
are	dynamic,	negotiated	and	renegotiated	among	the	various	actors.	 	Not	all	rights	derive	
from	 the	 state.	 	 Informal	 or	 customary	 rights,	 such	 as	 religious	 rights,	 may	 play	 an	
important	 part	 in	managing	 resources	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 	 For	 example,	women	may	 find	
themselves	 limited	 in	 operationalizing	 certain	 formal	 rights	 if	 various	 customary	 rights	
assign	the	role	to	manage	resources	to	men	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).		
2.4	 The	role	of	collective	action	in	community-level	resource	
management	
 
Collective	 action	 is	 defined	 as	 “action	 taken	 by	 a	 group	 (either	 directly	 or	 on	 its	 behalf	
through	an	organisation)	in	pursuit	of	members	perceived	shared	interest”	(Marshall	1998,	
emphasis	 added).	 	 The	 term	 “shared	 interest”	 implies	 the	 fair	 representation	 or	 the	
participation	 of	 all	 users	 in	 decision-making	 regarding	 resource	 use,	 development	 and	
conservation	 (political	 equality)	 and	 in	 benefiting	 from	 the	 resource	 (livelihoods).		
Collective	action	is	expressed	through	collective	decision-making	about	and	the	practicing	
of	 rules	 of	 using	 (and	 refraining	 from	 use)	 a	 resource,	 monitoring	 use,	 resolution	 of	
disputes	 and	 sanctioning.	 	 The	 actions	 of	 a	 user	 are	 usually	 under	 close	 observation	 by	
other	members	 of	 the	 community	 of	 users	 and	 the	major	 governance	mechanisms	 are	
formal	rules	as	well	as	“solidarity,	reciprocity	and	social	pressure	based	on	common	norms	
and	values”	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999:	p.	46).	
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The	 need	 for	 collective	 action	 among	 users1	 in	 the	management	 of	 the	 commons	 arises	
from	 certain	 characteristics	 of	 common-pool	 resources.	 	 The	 first	 two	 characteristics	 are	
due	 to	 the	physical	attributes	of	a	given	resource.	 	First,	 it	usually	 is	 too	 large	 to	exclude	
others	 from	 using	 it	 (exclusion).	 	 Second,	 its	 supply	 is	 limited,	 so	 the	 use	 by	 one	 actor	
reduces	 its	 availability	 to	 another	 (subtractability)	 (Tang	 1991;	 Hardin	 1968).	 	 Irrigation	
systems	 are	 perfect	 examples	 of	 a	 common-pool	 resource.	 	 Once	 the	 infrastructure	 is	
constructed,	 it	 is	 costly	 (although	not	 impossible)	 to	deny	access	 to	users.	 	Water	 is	 also	
limited,	so	the	amount	allocated	to	one	user	is	no	longer	available	to	another	(Tang	1991).		
Exclusion	poses	a	challenge	as	to	how	to	control	access	to	the	resource;	subtractability	 is	
concerned	with	distribution,	 in	other	words	with	the	dilemma	of	 instituting	“rules	among	
users	 to	 solve	 the	 potential	 divergence	 between	 individual	 and	 collective	 rationality”	
(Berkes	et	al.	1998:	p.6).		Collective	action	is	also	needed	when	there	is	multiple	use	of	the	
resource.	 	 Irrigation	 water	 that	 is	 used	 for	 agriculture,	 may	 also	 be	 used	 for	 domestic	
purposes	and	may	also	supply	water	to	livestock	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).		In	terms	
of	 field	 irrigation,	 different	 crops	 require	 different	 amounts	 of	 water	 and	 at	 various	
intervals.	 	 In	 these	 cases,	 rules	 for	 use	 must	 be	 negotiated	 between	 users,	 taking	 into	
consideration	the	needs	of	each.		Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	(1999)	write	that	local	collective	
action	may	be	instrumental	in	finding	management	solutions	that	are	seen	as	equitable	by	
the	users	themselves	(p.	47).	
	
With	respect	to	irrigation	water,	Meinzen-Dick	and	Pradhan	(2001:	p.13)	state,	“capturing	
and	conveying	water	to	the	locations	where	it	is	to	be	used	requires	collective	effort,	both	to	
appropriate	 and	 convey	 water	 and	 to	 make	 and	 rules	 for	 appropriation,	 allocation	 and	
distribution”.	 	 According	 to	 Vermillion	 (2001),	 collective	 action	 in	 irrigation	management	
usually	 takes	 three	 basic	 forms.	 	 The	 first	 is	 constitutional	 action,	 which	 establishes	 the	
organisational	 body	 through	which	 resources	 are	managed.	 	 In	 the	 case	of	 this	 research,	
these	 are	 the	 WUAs	 that	 have	 been	 established	 in	 Central	 Asia	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	
                                                
1	 	 Arguments	 regarding	 the	 inability	 of	 state	 agencies	 to	 effectively	 and	 sustainably	manage	 the	
commons	have	been	established.		The	third	alternative,	the	management	of	the	commons	as	
private	holdings	 is	 often	not	 feasible	because	of	 the	 great	deal	 of	 internal	 variation	 and	 the	
interdependence	with	other	units	that		makes	the	provision	of	individuals	with	a	viable	piece	of	
the	resource	very	difficult	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).			
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decentralization	 of	 water	 management	 and	 the	 devolution	 of	 responsibilities	 from	 the	
government	 to	 the	users,	and	 informal	organisations.	 	The	second	 type,	which	Vermillion	
(2001)	 calls	 collective	 choice	 processes	 refers	 to	 rules	 and	 sanctions	 for	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 of	 the	 system	 once	 established.	 	 The	 third	 type	 refers	 to	 its	 operational	
actions	 that	 include	 the	 implementation	 of	 operations,	 maintenance	 and	 dispute	
resolution.	 	 These	 three	 types	 have	 a	 hierarchical	 relationship.	 	 Constitutional	 action	
determines	collective	choice,	which	in	turn	determines	operational	actions.	
	
Vermillion’s	description	of	the	types	of	collective	action	is	limited	to	those	actions	that	arise	
as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 formal	 establishment	 of	 a	 group	 or	 an	 association.	 	 However,	 while	
collective	 action	 is	 often	 developed	 through	 formal	 channels	 (introduced	 by	 NGOs	 or	
government	agencies),	it	may	also	arise	from	sources	outside	a	formal	organisation,	either	
through	traditional	 institutions	or	spontaneous	cooperation	(Meinzen-Dick	et	al.	2001).	 	 It	
can	 be	 a	 one-time	 event	 or	 recurrent,	 in	 which	 case	 it	 becomes	 institutionalized.		
Institutionalization	of	a	particular	 form	of	 collective	action	 is	 likely	 to	occur,	 if	 it	 is	 in	 the	
recurrent	need	of	a	community	of	users.		
	
Problems	arise	when	cooperation	would	be	 in	the	users	 individual	and	collective	 interest,	
but	 when	 cost	 of	 cooperating	 with	 others	 exceeds	 the	 expected	 benefits.	 	 In	 that	 case	
individuals	are	tempted	not	to	cooperate,	even	if	it	is	clear	to	them,	that	non-cooperation	
will	damage	the	collective	effort.		The	problem	has	been	described	in	the	literature	as	the	
prisoner’s	 dilemma,	 free-rider	 problem,	 or	 the	 problem	 of	 collective	 and	 public	 goods	
(McKean	1992;	Rydin	et	al.	2000).		
2.5	 Theories	of	collective	action	
 
There	 are	 two	main	 lines	 of	 school	 of	 collective	 action.	 	 The	 first	 uses	 institutional	 and	
economic	analysis	of	local-level	collective	action	to	establish	certain	principles	or	conditions	
for	 the	 emergence	 of	 collective	 action	 institutions	 (Ostrom	 1990,	 1992;	 Tang	 1992).		
Mainstream	 institutional	 theory	 follows	the	tradition	of	Thomas	Hobbes	and	Adam	Smith	
for	whom	a	person	 is	a	 rational	 self-interested	 individual	 (Homo	economicus)	and	acts	as	
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such.		Institutional	theory	pictures	institutional	formation	as	a	managerial	activity,	whereby	
“successful”	 institutions	 can	be	 crafted	by	 external	 agencies,	 often	 in	 the	 form	of	 formal	
organisations.	 	 They	 often	 function	 based	 on	 economic	 rationality	 and	 without	 being	
embedded	 in	 the	 local	 context	 (Upton	 2005).	 	 The	 theory	 states	 that,	 under	 certain	
conditions	 users	 of	 a	 resource	 will	 cooperate	 and	 predict	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	
cooperation	 is	most	 likely	 to	 occur	 (Mosse	 1997).	 	 For	 example,	 based	 on	 the	 review	 of	
traditional	community-managed	irrigation	systems,	Tang	(1992)	and	Ostrom	(1992)	observe	
that	 a	 community	may	 successfully	 organize	 in	 those	 areas	 where	 there	 is	 a	 population	
pressure	or	a	limited	supply	of	water	or	both,	where	the	organisation	of	community	labour	
and	management	is	essential	to	gain	access	to	and	share	water,	and	to	minimize	conflicts.		
For	users	 to	get	 together	and	try	 to	 resolve	collective	action	problems,	 they	must	have	a	
strong	 interest	 in	 the	 resource	 (for	 example	 they	 depend	 on	 that	 resource	 for	 their	
livelihoods)	 (Mearns	 1996b)	 and	 mutual	 vulnerability	 defined	 by	 Singleton	 and	 Taylor	
(1992)	 as	 “the	 condition	 of	 a	 group	 of	 actors	 something	 which	 can	 be	 contributed	 or	
withheld	by	others	in	the	group	and	can	therefore	be	used	as	a	sanction	against	the	actor”	
(p.	 315).	 	 Other	 characteristics	 of	 the	 resource	 and	 the	 users	 that	 may	 support	 the	
emergence	of	collective	action	are:	the	presence	of	social	capital,	defined	as	“a	history	of	
cooperation	 and	 networks	 among	 group	 members”;	 a	 community	 with	 negligible	
differences	 in	 socio-economic	 conditions	 and	 in	 divisions	 (that	 would	 prevent	
communication	 among	 users);	 effective	 local	 leadership	 that	 also	 has	 the	 trust	 of	
community	members	(Meinzen-Dick	and	Knox	1999).		
	
The	 second	 school,	 the	 post-institutionalist	 approach,	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 traditions,	
moral	 codes,	 social	 rights	 and	 value	 systems	 in	 generating	 and	 preserving	 common	
resource	management	 systems.	 	 Its	 line	 of	 thought	 is	 associated	with	 that	 of	 Durkheim,	
according	to	whom	each	person	is	firstly	a	social	being	(Homo	socialogicus)	and	individual	
considerations	 and	 attitudes	 are	 only	 secondary.	 	 The	 post-institutionalist	 approach	
pictures	 institutional	development	as	an	opaque,	socially	embedded	process.	 	 Institutions	
are	“shaped	by	historical	factors,	by	the	power	relations	which	prevail	in	social	life	and	by	
world	views”	write	Cleaver	and	Franks	(2005:	p.	4).			
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Mosse	(1997)	points	out	that	one	of	 the	most	significant	 limitations	of	 the	 institutionalist	
school	is	the	narrow	and	utilitarian	view	of	institutions	of	collective	action.		He	writes	that	
often	 institutions	 are	 viewed	 as	 entities	 that	 are	 isolated	 from	 larger	 structures	 that,	 in	
reality	surround	them	and	influence	the	way	they	function.		Collective	action	within	those	
communities	is	pictured	as	“narrowly	utilitarian	and	economic,	effecting	the	separation	of	
resource	management	 from	other	aspects	of	 social	 life”	 (p.	470).	 	He	does	not	 reject	 the	
idea	that	common	pool	resource	management	–	where	it	emerged	and	was	maintained	–	
was	 the	 result	of	 individual	 strategy,	but	 suggests	 that,	 in	order	 to	understand	 common-
pool	resource	management	systems,	the	role	of	institutions	in	mediating	individual	strategy	
and	the	social	 relations	behind	them	have	not	been	taken	 into	account	(p.	472).	 	He	says	
that:		
“…attempting	 to	 account	 for	 the	 strengths	 and	weaknesses	 of	 institutions	 of	
resource	management	in	terms	of	the	balance	of	individual	economic	costs	and	
benefits	 gives	 little	 recognition	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 material	 interests	 are	 often	
inseparable	from	social	relationships,	and	that	choices	are	mediated	by	shared	
assumptions	 about	 such	 things	 as	 justice,	 fairness	 and	 reciprocity	 (Douglas,	
1986;	Spencer,	1990:	p.	98)”	(Mosse	1997).		
	
Over	 the	 past	 30	 years,	 theory	 about	 the	 decentralization	 of	 natural	 resource	
management	was	 translated	 into	 practice.	 	 Common-pool	 resource	 theory	 underpinned	
implementation	on	the	ground	and	has	dominated	research.		Saunders	(2014)	argues	that	
the	 outcomes	 of	 these	 projects	 have	 been	 disappointing	 and	 that	 common-pool	 theory	
may	 have	 contributed	 to	 failures.	 	 Central	 to	 his	 thesis	 is	 Elinor	 Ostrom’s	 work	 on	
common-pool	resource	theory	“because	of	its	 iconic	and	influential	status	and	its	explicit	
concern	with	praxis.”	(Saunders	2014:	p.	638).		According	to	Saunders	(2014),	and	echoing	
Mosse	 (1997;	 2003),	 successful	 cooperation	 among	 users	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	
interdependencies	 through	 kinship	 and	networks	 rather	 than	 formal	 institutions	 leading	
back	to	arguments	raised	earlier	about	visible	and	 invisible	 institutions	and	their	roles	 in	
water	resources	management.		
Ostrom’s	 communities	 have	 been	 depicted	 as	 relatively	 small	 sized,	 homogenous	 and	
isolated	(Ostrom	1990).		Cleaver	(2012)	and,	in	its	latter	work	Ostrom	(2010)	explores	the	
idea	of	policentricity,	where	those	communities,	with	perhaps	varying	interests,	are	linked	
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within	 a	 network	 and	 range	 of	 institutions	 within	 water	 governance.	 	 They	 are	 able	 to	
solve	problems	by	 themselves	 in	a	context	where	being	embedded	 in	a	complex	web	of	
institutional	arrangements,	including	with	the	government.		
Edelenbos	 and	 van	 Meerkerk	 (2015)	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 trust	 and	 boundary	 spanners	
within	these	networks.		Trust	is	defined	as	“a	stable	positive	expectation	that	actor	A	has	
(or	 predicts	 that	 he	 has)	 of	 the	 intentions	 and	 motives	 of	 Actor	 B	 in	 refraining	 from	
opportunistic	behaviour,	even	if	the	opportunity	arises”	(Edelenbos	and	Klijn	2007).		Trust	
develops	 within	 informal	 networks	 (Folke	 et	 al.	 2005).	 	 According	 to	 the	 authors,	 trust	
plays	an	important	part	within	an	informal	network	(and	outside	the	boundaries	of	formal	
positions)	 providing	 opportunities	 to	 get	 to	 know	 other	 actors’	 drivers,	 interests	 and	
values.	 	 It	 stimulates	 interaction,	 coordination	and	 information	exchange	among	various	
actors	and	increases	opportunities	for	partnerships	both	within	and	between	formal	and	
informal	institutions.		In	this	case,	the	possibility	that	actors	invest	money	and	knowledge	
in	developing	resources	in	a	collaborative	manner	is	more	likely.			
Resolving	 effectively	 complex	 water	 issues	 within	 a	 system	 of	 resource	 management	
requires	effective	 information	 sharing	among	 the	 relevant	 stakeholders.	 	 Edelenbos	and	
van	Meerkerk	(2015)	calls	boundary	spanners	those	who	are	able	to	link	members	of	the	
organization	 that	 they	 represent	 with	 various	 other	 organizations	 operating	 at	 various	
scales	 and	 select	 and	 channel	 information.	 	 These	 members	 must	 be	 willing	 to	
conceptualize	together	issue	and	problems,	seek	solutions	and	exchange	or	pool	together	
resources.	 	Through	 linkage-building,	boundary	spanners	play	an	 important	 role	 in	 trust-
building	 between	 members	 of	 informal	 networks	 and	 those	 acting	 within	 a	 formalized	
structure.	 	 Edelenbos	 and	 van	Meerkerk	 (2015)	 note	 that	 high-trust	 relationships	 could	
lead	 to	 insulated	 networks	 and	 communities	 which	 may	 hamper	 participation	 of	 the	
community	in	larger	networks.		
The	following	is	a	review	of	what	is	already	known	about	the	communities	and	formal	and	
informal	institutions	in	post-Socialist	countries.		Based	on	that	knowledge,	arguments	that	
support	 the	 theoretical	 approach	 advocated	 by	 Mosse	 (1997;	 2003)	 will	 be	 presented	
along	with	some	justifications	for	employing	his	approach	in	the	research	at	hand.	
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2.6	 Formal	and	informal	institutions	in	post-Socialist	
countries		
 
This	section	presents	a	literature	review	of	formal	and	informal	institutions	in	post-Socialist	
countries	in	Central	Asia,	 including	the	research	area	and	the	larger	Ferghana	Valley.	 	The	
research	location	is	described	in	greater	detail	under	section	3.2	entitled	“Research	Area”.		
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 many	 of	 the	 state	 institutions	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 an	
institutional	vacuum	was	created	and	most	of	the	management	roles	fell	into	the	hands	of	
local	users.	 	State	water	management	organisations	 that	were	designed	to	service	cotton	
mono-cropping	 collective	 farms,	 are	 unsuited	 to	 deal	 with	 thousands	 of	 small	 farmers	
“growing	 different	 crops	 and	 applying	 different	 agronomic	 and	 water	 management	
practices”	 (Abdullaev	 et	 al.	 2008).	 	 There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 voluntary	
collective	action	to	 fill	 that	 institutional	vacuum.	 	At	 the	same	time,	due	to	the	history	of	
top-down	 management,	 its	 emergence	 in	 the	 transitional	 context	 poses	 particular	
challenges.	 	 As	 Mearns	 (1996a:	 p.1)	 notes,	 “the	 language	 of	 collective	 action	 is	
unfortunately	 associated	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 with	 the	 failed	 experience	 of	
agricultural	collectivization”.		
	
Communities	of	users	 cannot	be	assumed	 to	exist	universally	or	 to	have	 the	capacity	 to	
create	 sustainable	 resource	 management	 regimes.	 	 In	 those	 communities	 where	 users	
managed	 the	 resource	 for	 less	 than	 one	 generation,	 or	 in	 those	 where	 the	 rights	 and	
responsibilities	 of	 users	 over	 the	 resource	 have	 been	 reduced	 or	 eliminated	 due	 to	
government	 or	 private-sector	 intervention	 in	management,	 collective	 action	 institutions	
may	 have	 weakened	 or	 disappeared	 and	 local	 know-how	 forgotten	 (Meinzen-Dick	 and	
Knox	 1999).	 	 Communities	 in	 post-Socialist	 countries	 experienced	major	 disruption	 and	
discontinuities	 in	 their	 societal	 and	 economic	 organisation.	 	 One	 of	 the	more	 recent	 of	
those	 disruptions	 was	 Soviet-era	 collectivization	 (Mearns	 1996a).	 	 Following	
collectivization	in	the	1930’s,	institutions	within	ex-Soviet	collective	farms	operated	based	
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on	 hierarchical	 relations	 and	 on	 top-down	 decision-making.2	 	 According	 to	 Mearns	
(1996a),	 the	 history	 of	 central	 management	 of	 natural	 resources	 contrasts	 with	 most	
customary	 self-governing	 institutions	 that	 are	 characterized	 by	 bottom-up	 decision-
making,	 trust	 and	 reciprocity	 and	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 commitment	 among	 members.		
Additionally,	while	 in	the	case	of	Soviet	style	management	“strong	 ideological	and	social	
norms”	 were	 imposed,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 community-adopted	 norms	 guide	 individual	
behaviour	(Mearns	1996a).		Lerman	et	al.	(2002)	explores	the	same	in	the	following	exert,	
pointing	 out	 that	 the	 most	 significant	 difference	 between	 Soviet-	 and	 western-style	
cooperation	is	that	while	the	former	was	force,	the	latter	has	always	been	voluntary:	
“…whether	 identified	 as	 collectives	 or	 cooperatives,	 the	 socialized	 farm	
structures	were	very	 far	 from	the	Western	model	of	a	cooperative:	 the	main	
attribute	 of	 cooperation	 -	 the	 principle	 of	 voluntary	 association	 for	 mutual	
benefit	 -	 was	 abandoned	 during	 Stalin’s	 forced	 collectivization	 campaign	 in	
1929-1930.		Instead,	the	creation	of	all	collective	and	cooperative	farms	in	the	
former	 socialist	 countries	 (both	 before	 and	 after	 World	 War	 II)	 relied	 on	
political	 and	 psychological	 coercion	 and	 was	 often	 associated	 with	
considerable	 brutality	 against	 the	 rural	 population.	 	 As	 a	 consequence,	
members	in	collectives	and	cooperatives	never	enjoyed	another	basic	attribute	
of	Western-style	cooperation	-	the	freedom	of	exit.”			
	
After	independence	in	1991,	in	order	to	reverse	the	top-down	management	trend,	to	adopt	
the	worldwide	 trend	 of	 irrigation	water	 transfer	 promoted	 by	 donors	 and	 to	 relieve	 the	
state	of	managing	irrigation	systems,	responsibilities	for	I&D	management	were	handed	to	
municipalities,	 or	WUAs	 created	 for	 that	 purpose.	 	WUAs	were	 first	 introduced	 in	 1995,	
with	the	purpose	of	undertaking	local-level	irrigation	and	drainage	management.		By	April	
2004,	59%	of	the	irrigated	land	area	was	managed	by	353	WUAs.		
	
It	appears	that,	 in	Kyrgyzstan,	the	mobilization	for	WUA	establishment,	 instead	of	being	a	
grass-root	response	to	solving	problems	related	to	irrigation	water	management	(Wegerich	
2000)	has	been	donor	driven3.	 	Their	establishment	followed	a	top-down	approach.	 	They	
                                                
2	 This	 type	 of	 centralized	 management	 where	 farmers	 are	 seen	 as	 workers	 of	 the	 land	 (not	 as	
decision-makers)	are	called	«	estate	mode	»	in	Africa,	where	smallholder	irrigation	themes	were	
managed	through	an	elaborate	centralized	system	(Shah	et	al.	2002)	
3	Sehring	(forthcoming)	writes	that	international	donors	put	IMT	policies	and	the	establishment	of	
WUAs	as	a	condition	for	receiving	grants.		
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therefore	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 embedded	 in	 the	 communities,	 which	 they	 serve	
(Hassan	et	al.	2004).	In	the	early	years	of	WUA	implementation,	Sehring	(2007)	wrote	that,	
in	 the	 context	of	her	 research,	WUAs	 could	not	be	 seen	as	participatory	mechanisms	 for	
the	 simple	 reason	 that	 users	 had	 little	 awareness	 of	 their	 purpose	 and	 functioning.	 	 The	
failure	of	some	WUAs	to	serve	as	participatory	mechanisms	may	be	explained	by	the	fact	
that,	as	explained	earlier,	participation	is	low	on	the	initiator/implementer’s	agenda.		
	
More	recently	and	building	on	substantial	evidence	of	WUA	performance	over	10	years	in	
Uzbekistan,	Moss	and	Hamidov	 (2016)	examine	representation,	 leadership	and	regulation	
within	 WUAs	 there.	 	 They	 find	 that	 representation	 is	 generally	 weak	 within	 the	 WUAs.		
Inclusion	and	consultation,	real	dialogue,	among	and	with	WUA	members	are	 lacking	and	
representation	is	left	to	paid	officials,	mostly	to	the	Chairman	of	the	WUA.		They	find	that	
WUAs	generally	act	on	behalf	of	the	members	but	not	at	their	behest.		Moss	and	Hamidov	
(2016)	note	that	the	development	of	 inclusive	and	collaborative	governance	 is	challenged	
by	the	strong	legacy	of	hierarchical	leadership	in	the	country.		Leaders	of	WUAs	and	WUGs	
need	 to	 command	 respect	 and	 cooperation	 from	 members.	 	 However,	 old	 elites	 still	
command	 considerable	 influence	 with	 regard	 to	 these	 positions,	 raising	 the	 risk	 of	
patronage	 and	 clientelism.	 	 Challenges	 also	 emerge	 around	 regulation.	 	 Water	
requirements	for	planned	crops	prepared	by	the	WUA	is	often	rendered	redundant	by	the	
Basin	Irrigation	System	Authority	that	imposes	its	own	quotas	without	regards	to	the	needs	
expressed	by	the	WUA.	According	to	Moss	and	Hamidov	(2016):				
“The	experience	of	WUAs	in	the	Uzbek	section	of	the	Fergana	Valley	–	and	not	
only	there	–	 is	a	sobering	one.	Whilst	 it	 is	perhaps	 inevitable	that	the	WUAs	
could	never	meet	all	 the	expectations	made	of	them	at	their	 inception,	their	
general	 lack	 of	 impact	 on	 irrigation	 services	 and	 water	 governance	 is	
indicative	of	deeper,	 structural	weaknesses	 in	water	and	 land	management.	
WUAs	in	Uzbekistan	are,	in	essence,	not	really	water	users	associations	at	all,	
in	that	they	were	created	by	central	government	decree,	permit	only	minimal	
representation	 of	 water	 users	 and	 operate	 to	 satisfy	 state	 targets	 for	 cash	
crops	in	accordance	with	state	quotas	for	water	allocation.”	(p	164)	
	
	
In	the	tradition	of	Putnam	(1995),	a	network	of	civil	society	actors	generate	trust	among	
individuals	 and	 are	 able	 to	 create	 or	 strengthen	 collective	 action	 (see	 also	 Chapter	 2,	
Section	 2.5).	 	 The	 “traditional”	 civil	 society	 covers	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 actors	 and	
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organisations	“that	are	a	means	to	an	end:	a	potential	 force	for	positive	change	through	
people’s	 participation	 and	 empowerment.”	 (Giffen	 et	 al.	 no	 date).	 	 The	 alternative	
approach	 can	 include	 ideas	 of	 ‘traditional’	 or	 ‘communal’	 civil	 society.	 	 The	 link	 among	
these	actors	“is	the	use	of	the	concept	of	civil	society	to	legitimize	their	right	to	resist	the	
prevailing	development	paradigm”	(Howell	and	Pearce	2001:	p.36).		
	
Giffen	 et	 al.	 (no	 date)	 write	 that	 there	 is	 various	 understanding	 of	 civil	 society	 among	
policy-makers,	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 Central	 Asia.	 	 At	 this	
time,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 direction	 development	 has	 taken	 and	 the	 dominant	 policies,	 a	
certain	 model	 of	 civil	 society	 is	 being	 created	 and	 promoted,	 notably	 by	 international	
organisations.	 	 One	 aspect	 of	 this	 is	 the	 promotion	 of	 non-governmental	 organisations	
(NGOs).	 	 Another	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 interactions	 and	 practices	 that	 have	
evolved	in	these	societies	over	time.		
	
According	 to	Olivier	 Roy	 (2002),	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 civil	 society	 does	 not	 exist	 in	
Central	Asia	and	has	to	be	created	is	prevalent	because	“…there	is	nothing	of	value	today	
upon	which	to	build	(the	entire	Soviet	legacy	being	cast	as	negative)	–	or	because	there	is	no	
such	 thing	 as	 a	 traditional	 society	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 owing	 to	 the	 onslaught	 of	 the	 Soviet	
system	on	previous	social	structures.”		Olivier	Roy	(2002)	notes	that	Central	Asian	countries	
are	 endowed	 with	 an	 “immense	 social	 fabric”,	 which	 are	 prevalent	 in	 the	 strong	 social	
networks	running	across	families,	kin,	villages	and	 in	the	form	of	community	 interactions.		
This	 richness	 of	 the	 social	 fabric	 is	 also	 expressed	 through	 pre-Soviet,	 Soviet	 and	
contemporary	institutions.		In	contrast	with	the	“neo-liberal”	approach,	he	describes	what	
Freizer	 (2004)	 terms	 communal	 civil	 society,	 a	 space	 for	 informal	 groups	 and	 group	
activities	 that	are	established	based	on	trust	and	reciprocity	and	are	 frequently	based	on	
kinship	 relations.	 	 It	 does	 not	 address	 state-society	 relations.	 	 Rather	 it	 treats	 relations	
within	 the	 community.	 	 It	 “contains	 repression	 as	 well	 as	 democracy,	 conflict	 as	 well	 as	
cooperation,	vice	as	well	as	virtue”	(Robinson	and	White	1997,	quoted	in	Freizer	2004).		
	
The	 kolkhoz,	 although	 much	 neglected	 in	 the	 development	 literature	 and	 in	 scholarly	
research,	 remains	 a	 “part	 of	 “real”	 society,	 civil	 or	 not”	 and	 its	 memory	 continues	 to	
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represent	 collective	 identities	 (Roy	 1999).	 	 According	 to	 Roy	 (2001),	 during	 the	
collectivization,	 traditional	 solidarity	 groups,	 or	 clans,	 turned	 into	 collective	 brigades	 but	
kept	their	traditional	roles.		During	the	communist	era,	the	Soviet	influence	in	rural	Central	
Asia	was	limited.	 	Many	of	the	leaders	of	the	kolkhoz	were	of	 local	origin.	 	Being	far	from	
the	centre	of	power,	they	functioned	more	as	 local	 leaders,	than	as	apparatchiks.	 	During	
the	 period	when	 farmers	 turn	 to	 private	 farming	 they	 continue	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 collective	
identities	that	were	inherited	to	protect	them	from	state	encroachment	and	privatization.		
The	traditional	solidarity	groups	-	clan	networks	-	were,	therefore,	little	transformed	by	the	
Soviet-era	and	managed	to	regain	their	role	during	the	de-collectivization	period.				
“the	 Central	 Asian	 kolkhoz	 produced	 new	 clans	 and	 tribes,	 as	 patronage	
networks	 and	 extended	 family	 tribes	woven	 inside	 the	 kolkhoz	 stretched	 and	
thrived	outside	the	kolkhoz.		Here	we	have	the	revenge	of	a	traditional	culture	
and	society	on	an	imported	system”	(Roy,	1999).	
	
Upton	 (2005),	who	researched	 institutions	among	Mongolian	herders	after	 the	demise	of	
the	 Soviet	 supported	 collectivized	 agricultural	 sector,	 also	 notes	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
institutional	 elements	 of	 the	 collective	 era.	 	 According	 to	 her	 research	 findings,	 customs	
and	 traditions	 that	 are	 held	 among	 Mongol	 herders	 are	 informed	 by	 the	 various	
experiences	 during	 the	 collective	 period	 and	 an	 “idealized	 precollective	 past”.	 	 Bichsel	
(2006),	 while	 examining	 how	 socially	 embedded	 institutions	 are	 used	 in	 a	 Mercy	 Corps	
project	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 to	 “increase	 the	 community’s	 sense	 of	 ownership	 towards	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 project”	 (p.	 108),	 notes	 that	 a	 project	was	 purposefully	 built	 on	 existing	
organisations,	 such	 as	 community	 labour,	 elders,	 youth	 summer	 camps	 and	 religious	 or	
secular	organisations.		Among	those,	community	labour	and	youth	camps	are	identified	as	
Soviet	era,	while	others	as	pre-Soviet	(p.115).			
	
Due	 to	 the	 resignation	 of	 farmers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 cannot	 count	 on	 government	
support	for	I&D	management	there	is	evidence	that	socially	embedded	institutions	provide	
services	 that	 government	 institutions	 are	 not	 able	 to	 (Thurman	 2003).	 	 He	 writes	 that	
WUAs	 “are	not	 able	 to	 supervise	 every	 outlet,	 and	 therefore	 the	people	 themselves	must	
help	in	supervision”	(p.	28).		In	particular,	farmers	take	part	in	the	traditional	ashar	(Bichsel	
2006)	and	avandaz,	 the	management	of	water	delivery	 to	 fields	 (Thurman	2003).	 	Ashar,	
which	means	 voluntary	 collective	work	 and	where	 a	 group	 of	 people,	 acquaintances	 and	
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relatives	are	mobilized	to	help	a	household	in	such	activities	as	harvesting	crops	or	building	
a	 house	 is	 an	 institution	 of	 collective	 action	 that	 was	 common	 in	 the	 pre-Soviet	 period.		
Today	it	appears	to	be	in	decline	in	terms	of	inter-household	cooperation,	but	it	resurfaces	
and	 is	 endowed	 with	 new	 meanings,	 such	 as	 community	 self-help	 groups	 in	 the	 larger	
context	 of	 institutional	 transformation.	 	 Another	 traditional	 institution,	 the	 Elders’	 Court	
that	 operates	 based	 on	 traditional	 and	 customary	 law,	 plays	 an	 active	 role	 in	 conflict	
resolution	 (Thurman	 2003;	 Bichsel	 2006).	 Bischel	 (2006)	 writes	 that	 its	 role	 is	 being	
formalized	by	the	State,	which	seeks	to	“introduce	traditional	institutions	with	the	purpose	
of	 nation-building,	 but	 also	 for	 outsourcing	 services	 that	 it	was	 not	willing	 or	 capable	 to	
assume"	(p.	116).	
	
Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016)	 note	 the	 recent	 emergence	 of	 Water	 Users	 Groups	 (WUGs),	
which	 are	 self-initiatives	 organized	 by	 the	 water	 users	 to	 seek	 solutions	 to	 local	 water	
conflicts	organize	rules	for	distribution	and	monitor	water	allocation.		These	groups	emerge	
parallel	 to	WUAs.	 	 They	are	 self-organized	 institutions	 that	 grow	out	of	 former	 collective	
farm	brigades,	extended	families,	or	clans,	etc.	creating	further	evidence	of	the	continued	
persistence	 and	 importance	 of	 informal	 and	 traditional	 institutions.	 	WUGs	 do	 not	 have	
legal	 rights	 or	 representation	 and	 their	 degree	 of	 influence	 and	 power	 within	 the	WUA	
depends	on	the	WUA	Chairman’s	willingness	to	share	power	and	representation.		Although,	
WUGs	 are	 recent	 and	 there	 is	 limited	 experience	 of	 their	 capacity	 for	 collective	 action,	
there	is	a	sense	that	they	create	greater	power	for	decision-making	among	users,	creating	a	
greater	sense	of	collective	responsibility	and	may	stimulate	communication	and	learning	in	
WUAs.	(see	also	Chapter	2,	Section	2.5).		
	
Based	 on	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov’s	 (2016)	 observations	 of	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	
Uzbekistan,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 WUGs	 resonates	 with	 Lankford	 and	
Hepworth’s	 (2010)	 “bazaar”	 model	 of	 water	 management.	 	 Rather	 than	 a	 “cathedral”	
model	of	hierarchical,	centralised	institutional	framework,	the	“bazaar”	model	allows	the	
co-existence	 of	 a	 network	 of	 decentralised,	 horizontal	 and	 polycentric	 institutions.		
According	 to	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016),	 the	 “bazaar”	 model	 is	 especially	 suited	 to	
situations	 characterised	 by	 “little	 reliable	 data,	 fluctual	 water	 supply	 and	 demand	 and	
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under-resourced	 regulatory	 agencies	 –	 all	 factors	 prevalent	 in	 the	 Fergana	 Valley”.	 (see	
also	Chapter	2,	Section	2.5).		
	
This	 research	 adopts	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 builds	 on	 a	 contextual	 and	 dynamic	
understanding	of	 institutions	by	extending	the	definition	of	 institutions	from	formal	rules,	
norms	and	organisations	 to	more	 informal	opaque,	 formally	 embedded	products	of	 their	
political,	 economic,	 cultural,	 social	 and	 religious	 environment.	 	 This	 approach	 seems	
justified,	 given	 the	 richness	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Central-Asian	 institutions	 –	 formal	 and	
informal	 –	 and	 the	 recent	 changes	 in	 them	 as	 a	 result	 of	 larger	 political	 and	 economic	
decisions	and	state	structures	that	are	now	driving	the	actions	and	incentives	of	people	in	
relation	to	institutions.		
2.7	 Households	and	livelihoods	
 
To	 understand	 the	 stakes	 that	 farmers	 have	 in	 managing	 their	 resources,	 one	 must	
understand	the	importance	of	irrigation	water	for	livelihoods.		Messer	and	Townsley	(2003)	
define	 households	 as	 "…a	 group	 of	 people	 who	 eat	 from	 a	 common	 pot,	 and	 share	 a	
common	 stake	 in	 perpetuating	 and	 improving	 their	 socioeconomic	 status	 from	 one	
generation	 to	 the	 next."	 	 Livelihoods	 are	 the	 strategies	 that	 households	 use	 to	 make	 a	
living,	to	ensure	food	and	income	and	achieve	relative	well-being.		Livelihoods	include	the	
various	 capitals	 that	 influence	well-being	 –	human,	 physical,	 social,	 natural	 and	 financial,	
the	activities	that	they	employ	to	satisfy	needs,	certain	factors	that	people	cannot	influence	
(weather,	natural	disasters	and	economic	trends)	as	well	as	the	institutions	that	guide	their	
activities.			
	
Messet	 and	 Townsley	 (2003)	 writes	 that	 “institutions	 affect	 the	 different	 livelihoods	 and	
capitals	 that	people	use	 for	 their	 livelihoods	–	by	controlling	access	 to	 those	assets,	or	by	
influencing	how,	where,	when	and	by	whom	they	are	used”	(p.16).		Or,	looking	at	it	another	
way,	households	take	into	consideration	the	resources,	rights	and	institutions	available	to	
them	to	find	the	most	appropriate	 livelihood	strategy	possible.	 	Therefore,	to	understand	
what	shapes	collective	action	in	building	institutions	in	a	particular	context,	the	importance	
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of	irrigation	water	to	local	livelihoods	must	be	understood.		Since	the	research	focuses	on	
irrigation	 water	 management	 on	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 community,	 one	 particular	 aspect	 of	
livelihoods,	farming,	must	form	an	integral	part	of	the	research.	 	Land-	and	water	use	are	
intimately	related.		The	size	of	the	farm,	the	modes	of	farming	techniques	that	the	farmers	
use	to	cultivate	crops	and	the	choice	of	crops	determine	needs	for	irrigation	water	as	well	
as	 the	 strategies	 that	 are	 suitable	 to	 achieve	 sustainability.	 	 Engagement	 in	 farming	
activities	means	that	the	farmer	would	have	an	interest	in	participating	in	irrigation	water	
management,	while	 someone	who	holds	a	day	 job	would	have	 less	 time	 to	participate	 in	
decision-making	about	distribution	and	maintenance.	
	
Additionally,	 to	 understand	 the	 opportunities	 and	 incentives	 that	 users	 may	 have	 to	
participate	 in	 collective	 action	 and	 their	 powers	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 the	
“rules	 in	use”,	users	cannot	be	conceptualized	merely	according	to	their	productive	roles,	
such	as	 ‘farmers’	or	 ‘irrigators’.	 	 This	 is	because	 these	 terms	do	not	 fully	 and	adequately	
reflect	 the	 social	 identities	 of	 the	 users	 (members	 of	 a	 minority	 group;	 women),	 which	
influence	 their	 opportunities	 in	 negotiating	 access	 to	 and	 control	 over	 the	 I&D	 system	
(Cleaver	and	Franks	2005).		
	
To	describe	the	social	identities	of	the	users,	this	study	will	use	the	livelihood	perspective.		
The	 livelihood	 perspective,	 as	 defined	 by	 de	Haan	 and	 Zoomers	 (2005),	 does	 not	merely	
allow	to	map	the	strategies	 that	people	adopt	to	obtain	productive	resources	or	 increase	
their	productivity,	but	it	also	encompasses	all	the	strategies	which	are	available	to	them	to	
act,	including	claims	and	access	to	resources	and	the	right	to	participate	in	decision-making	
about	the	management	of	a	particular	resource.		The	livelihood	approach	will	also	allow	for	
the	mapping	of	livelihoods	and	irrigation	water	needs	and	endowments.			
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Chapter	3	 Research	methods		
 
3.1	 Research	approach,	data	collection	and	analysis	
 
This	 research	 looks	 into	 issues	 and	 challenges	 related	 to	 irrigation	 water	 use	 and	
management	on	the	local	scale.		The	case	study	approach	was	chosen	as	the	framework	of	
inquiry.	 	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 case	 study	 approach,	 the	 inquiry	was	 built	 through	 a	
literature	 review	 that	 explores	 historical	 and	 contemporary	 rural,	 agricultural	 and	
irrigation	 issues	 in	general	and	 in	 the	Central	Asian	context.	 	During	a	 three-month	 long	
fieldwork,	 information	was	 gathered	 first	 hand	 through	 interviews	 (open-ended	 and	 in-
depth)	 with	 farmer	members	 of	WUA,	 with	 officials	 of	 government	 irrigation	 agencies,	
with	 representatives	 of	 informal	 organisations	 and	 through	 participant	 observation.	 	 In	
this	 chapter,	 the	 framework	and	 the	methods	used	 in	 the	 research	and	 their	 limitations	
are	presented.		The	research	location	is	introduced	and	considerations	that	influenced	the	
selection	 of	 the	 research	 location	 and	 the	 criteria	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 interlocutors	 are	
explained.	 	The	chapter	also	includes	reflection	on	issues,	problems	and	limitation	that	I,	
as	researcher,	encountered	during	the	fieldwork.	
	
The	framework	for	the	data	collection	was	the	case	study	approach.	 	Yin	(2003)	supports	
the	use	of	the	case	study	approach	in	circumstances	when	a	research	examines	complex	
and	 contextual	 contemporary	 phenomena	 over	 which	 the	 researcher	 has	 little	 or	 no	
control.		Moreover,	in	documenting	and	writing	a	case	study,	the	researcher	may	rely	on	
multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence,	 based	 on	 various	 methods	 of	 collecting	 information	
(literature	 review,	 observation,	 various	 interviewing	 methods),	 he	 writes.	 	 While	
conventional	 opinions	 judge	 the	 case	 study	 method	 unsuitable,	 because,	 among	 other	
criticisms,	the	context	is	uncontrollable,	giving	too	much	scope	for	interpretations	by	the	
researcher	 thereby	 making	 it	 unsuitable	 for	 rigorous	 scientific	 inquiry,	 Flyvbjerg	 (2006)	
argues	 in	 favour	 of	 understanding	 context-specificity	 in	 researching	 human	 behaviour.		
According	to	him,	taking	into	consideration	the	fact	that	human	behaviour	is	much	more	
complex	than	to	reduce	it	to	rule-governing	facts,	a	case	study	provides	an	opportunity	for	
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the	“nuanced	view	of	reality”.		He	adds	that	the	proximity	of	the	researcher	to	the	object	
of	 study	provides	 an	opportunity	 for	 concrete	 experiences,	 for	 feedback	 and	avoids	 the	
“academic	blind	alleys,	where	the	effect	and	usefulness	of	research	becomes	unclear	and	
untested”	(p.	223).	 	By	the	following	citation	of	Campbell	 (1975,	cited	 in	Flyvbjerg	2006),	
he	indicates	the	necessity	of	making	research	into	human	behaviour	context	specific	and	
the	inherent	bias	in	any	such	research:	
“After	 all,	 man	 is,	 in	 his	 ordinary	 way,	 a	 very	 competent	 knower,	 and	
qualitative	common-sense	knowing	is	not	replaced	by	quantitative	knowing.	.	.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	such	common	sense	naturalistic	observation	is	objective,	
dependable,	 or	 unbiased.	 But	 it	 is	 all	 that	 we	 have.	 It	 is	 the	 only	 route	 to	
knowledge—	noisy,	fallible,	and	biased	though	it	be.	(pp.	179,	191)”	
	
Baxter	 and	 Eyles	 (1997)	 express	 concerns	 over	 “rigor”	 in	 qualitative	 research	 where	 a	
researcher	 is	 faced	with	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 “creativity	 of	 the	 qualitative	 research	
process	–	which	implies	contingent	methods	to	capture	the	richness	of	context	dependent	
sites	 and	 situations	 –	 and	 evaluation	 –	 which	 implies	 standardized	 procedures	 and	
methods	of	reporting”	(p.	505).		They	recognize	that	the	“characteristics”	of	the	researcher	
in	interpreting	the	findings	is	gaining	increasing	importance	in	qualitative	research.		They	
suggest	 that	 the	 reflectivity	 of	 the	 researcher	 in	 terms	 of	 explicitly	 acknowledging	 the	
research	processes	(fieldwork,	data	analysis	and	interpretation)	and	their	limitations	is	an	
important	 tool	 in	 making	 research	 “rigorous”	 (valid,	 reliable	 and	 objective,	 responsible	
and	honest).		
	
The	 literature	 review	 was	 based	 on	 past	 and	 current	 academic	 work	 on	 irrigation	
decentralization.	 	Through	networking	with	fellow	researchers,	 I	 tried	to	 incorporate	the	
results	of	the	most	recent	research	in	the	literature	review	and	identify	issues	that	needed	
to	 be	 further	 explored.	 	 To	 grasp	 institutional	 change	 during	 the	 pre-collectivisation,	
collectivization	and	post-collectivization	eras	and	to	set	the	larger	institutional	context,	a	
historical	analysis	of	pre-Soviet	and	Soviet	era	irrigation	institutions	formed	the	part	of	the	
literature	review.			
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In	collecting	data,	I	relied	greatly	on	participant	observation,	which	involved	my	presence	
in	the	field	and	participation	in	farmer’s	activities.		I	chose	to	stay	in	one	of	the	villages	in	
the	 region	where	 I	wished	 to	study	 irrigation	practices.	 	 Staying	 in	 the	 research	 location	
and	 living	with	 a	 farmer	 family	 allowed	me	 to	 be	 present	 at	 all	 times	 creating	 suitable	
conditions	 for	 participant	 observation.	 	 Jorgensen	 (1989)	 writes	 that	 participant	
observation	in	human	studies	is	a	suitable	method	of	data	collection	when	the	research	is	
about	human	meanings	and	interactions	best	observed	in	everyday	life.		The	phenomenon	
or	activity	must	be	sufficiently	limited	in	space	and	time	to	provide	a	suitable	subject	for	
observation	and	qualitative	data	is	sufficient	to	answer	the	research	question.		In	my	case,	
learning	 about	 the	 livelihoods,	 the	 culture	 and	 the	 religion	 was	 very	 valuable	 in	
understanding	people’s	behaviour	towards	each	other	when	it	came	to	sharing	resources.		
Being	 present,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 profit	 from	 chance	 encounters	 (which	 allowed	 for	 casual	
conversations,	in-depth,	open-ended	interviews	and	transect	walks	to	collect	information	
for	 case	 studies).	 	 I	 studied	 irrigation	 practices	 by	 participating	 in	 the	 daily	 activities	 of	
farmers	and	from	my	point	of	view,	this	was	the	only	strategy	by	which	I	could	gain	a	deep	
insight	 into	 the	 culture	 and	 livelihoods	 that	 otherwise	 (through,	 for	 example,	 random	
visits)	 would	 have	 remained	 unknown	 to	me.	 	 Once	 I	 became	 known,	 I	 was	 invited	 to	
lifecycle	 celebrations,	 to	 marriages	 and	 to	 an	 endless	 number	 of	 teas,	 that	 helped	
establish	friendships,	respect	and	trust	between	the	users	and	I.	
	
My	 participation	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork	 varied	 between	 moderate	 and	 active	
participation	 (DeWalt	 and	 DeWalt	 2002).	 	 DeWalt	 and	 DeWalt	 (2002)	 describe	 active	
participation	as	a	situation	when	the	researcher	engages	 in	the	community’s	activities	 in	
order	to	 learn	about	rules	of	behaviour,	while	 in	the	case	of	moderate	participation,	the	
researcher	 is	 present	 in	 the	 communities	 and	 identified	 as	 a	 researcher,	 but	 instead	 of	
actively	participating,	he/she	acts	as	an	observer	who	only	occasionally	interacts	with	the	
people.	 	 My	 research	 was	 overt	 (Whyte	 1984),	 meaning	 that	 people	 around	 me	 were	
aware	of	my	interest	and	purpose,	an	awareness	which	in	some	cases	certainly	biased	the	
research	by	 influencing	 farmer’s	behaviour	 towards	me.	 	On	 the	other	hand,	choosing	a	
“degree”	 of	 participation	 was	 not	 a	 conscious	 decision	 on	 my	 part.	 	 Rather,	 it	 was	
determined	by	the	circumstances	and	by	the	people	surrounding	me.		
	 31	
	
Interviews	with	water	 users	 and	with	 officials	were	 central	 to	 this	 research.	 	 Of	 the	 41	
interviews	 that	 I	 conducted	 35	 were	 with	 farmers	 within	 one	 canal	 system	 and	
encompassing	two	communities	and	six	with	various	officials.		Out	of	the	35	interviewees,	
13	were	women	and	22	were	men.		
The	selection	criteria	based	on	which	the	survey	population	were	selected	were:		
• irrigation	 water	 users.	 Their	 source	 of	 irrigation	 water	 is	 the	 Dzsijde-Munduz	
canal;	
• rights	 holders.	 They	 held	 water	 rights	 water	 and	made	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	
WUA	for	water	delivery	 in	exchange	for	payment	(or	were	the	relatives	of	those	
holding	rights	and	lived	in	the	same	household);		
• small	landowners.		
Given	the	conflicts	between	those	who	own	lands	situated	upstream	and	downstream	(or	
at	 the	head	and	tail	ends	along	 the	canal),	 the	survey	population	 included	 farmers	 from	
both	the	head	and	tail	ends.		
	
The	 research	was	 conducted	during	 the	 irrigation	 season	and	 farmers	were	 approached	
during	 transect	 walks	 while	 making	 field	 observations.	 	 The	 timing	 provided	 an	
opportunity	to	observe	irrigation	practices	and	irrigation	issues	that	were	on	the	minds	of	
people	 and	 were	 frequently	 subject	 of	 conversations.	 	 Approaching	 farmers	 during	
transect	walks	required	opportunity	sampling,	or	on	the	spot	decisions	about	sampling,	as	
well	 as	 informal	 conversational	 interviews	 (one-on-one)	 and	 informal	 group	 interviews.		
This	sampling	technique	is	well	suited	for	direct	observation,	because	 it	offers	maximum	
flexibility	 to	 pursue	 information.	 	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 expanding	 on	 information	 gathered	
previously	 and	 building	 on	 interviews	 already	 completed.	 	 For	 more	 in-depth	
understanding	of	how	certain	institutions	function,	I	made	use	of	methods	that	are	usually	
classified	under	purposive	sampling	(or	judgment	sampling).		Based	on	earlier	interviews	I	
selected	 information	 rich	 cases	 for	 in-depth,	 unstructured	 interviews	 (Patton	 2001).		
Interviews	with	representatives	of	local-level	bureaucratic	organisations	were	undertaken	
through	 direct	 contact	 and	 snowball	 sampling,	 or	 “identifying	 cases	 of	 interest	 from	
sampling	 people	 who	 know	 people	 who	 know	 people	 who	 know	 what	 cases	 are	
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information	 rich,	 that	 is,	 good	 examples	 of	 study,	 good	 interview	 participants”	 (Patton	
2001)	thorough	contacts	at	various	formal	and	informal	organisations	and	during	random	
interviews	in	the	field	and	on	other	locations.		
	
My	 interpreter	 also	 acted	 as	 my	 main	 informant.	 	 He,	 as	 a	 well-known	 and	 respected	
member	 of	 the	 community	 and	 a	 part-time	 farmer	 himself,	 ensured	 my	 access	 to	 the	
communities	of	users.	 	He	taught	me	much	about	the	culture,	about	how	to	respectfully	
present	 myself	 in	 front	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 traditional	 and	 Muslim	 communities	 that	 I	
studied;	 about	 farming	 and	 irrigation	 problems,	 and	 offered	 precisions	 regarding	
geographic,	 historic,	 cultural	 and	 religious	 issues.	 	 My	 interview	 strategy	 consisted	 of	
interviewing	a	large	number	of	farmers,	most	of	them	only	once.		Being	very	busy	and	in	
the	 midst	 of	 the	 irrigation	 season,	 they	 seemed	 to	 be,	 except	 for	 a	 few	 examples,	
reluctant	to	meet	me	more	than	once.		While	the	first	meeting	does	not	usually	allow	for	
“building	rapport”	and	results	mostly	in	normative	statements	(Whyte	1984),	I	found	that	
most	 farmers	 seemed	 open,	 talkative	 and	 comfortable	 in	 my	 and	 my	 interpreter’s	
presence.		
	
The	main	tools	of	data	collection	were	open-ended	questionnaires.		In	her	analysis	of	the	
particularities	of	 doing	 research	 in	post-Soviet	 countries,	 Kandiyoti	 (1999)	questions	 the	
suitability	and	usefulness	of	 surveys	and	closed-ended	questions	as	 they	provide	 limited	
freedom	to	uncover	the	subtleties	of	various	concepts,	and	therefore	the	opportunities	to	
gain	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 the	 context.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 open-ended	questionnaires,	
the	 interviewer	 still	 guides	 the	 conversation,	 but	 leaves	 much	 more	 freedom	 for	 the	
interviewee	to	describe	their	own	experiences.		The	use	of	open-ended	questionnaires	still	
ensures	that	the	same	topics	are	covered,	and	that	a	comparison	of	data	 is	still	possible	
during	the	subsequent	analysis.	
	
A	 list	of	questions	 that	 I	used	as	a	guide	 for	 the	 interviews	 is	presented	 in	Annex	A.	 	To	
measure	the	performance	of	collective	action,	the	study	explores	institutions	and	gives	a	
description	 of	 their	 characteristics	 (participation	 in	 making	 rules,	 collective	 decision-
making,	observing	rules	and	putting	them	in	practice	collectively,	sanctioning).		Therefore,	
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the	majority	 of	 the	 questions	 focuses	 on	whether	 or	 not	 users	 employ	 institutions	 and	
participate	in	various	organisations	or	spontaneous	cooperation	to	access	and	manage	the	
I&D	 system	 and	 how	 those	 institutions	 function.	 	 Some	 questions	 focused	 on	 the	
characteristics	 of	 users	 and	 their	 households,	 including	 their	 livelihood	 activities	 and	
socio-economic	 characteristics.	 	 Questions	 pertinent	 to	 user	 water	 needs	 and	
endowments,	 including	 alternative	 water	 sources,	 were	 also	 included.	 	 The	 degree	 to	
which	 individuals	 and	 households	 rely	 on	 irrigation	water	 and	 to	which	 the	 resource	 is	
available	to	them	(from	irrigation	canals	or	from	other	sources)	helps	estimate	the	stakes	
and	 incentives	 that	 users	 have	 in	 institution	 building.	 	 The	 socio-economic	 data	 help	
determine	which	strata	of	the	population	(based	on	wealth,	gender,	religion	and	ethnicity)	
participate	 in	 which	 institution/spontaneous	 cooperation	 and	 identified	 those	 who	 are	
marginalized.		
	
The	questionnaires	that	I	drafted	prior	to	the	fieldwork,	and	that	contained	mostly	open-
ended	 questions	 (and	 some	 closed	 ended	 questions),	 were	 changed	 and	 finalized	 after	
getting	 to	 know	 the	 communities	 and	 having	 completed	 the	 first	 few	 interviews.	 	 The	
initial	 questionnaire	 was	 quite	 broad,	 covering	 issues	 related	 to	 all	 three	 types	 of	
landholdings,	 such	 as	 shareholders	 land	 (ülüs),	 kitchen	 gardens	 (tamorka)	 and	
government-owned	lands	(arenda).	 	After	the	first	 interviews	I	realized	that	covering	the	
issues	 related	to	 the	management	of	 the	 three	 types	of	 landholdings	brought	out	broad	
and	complex	issues,	to	which	I	could	not	have	done	justice	over	a	three-month	long	field	
research	period.	 	 I	 therefore	decided	 to	 focus	mainly	on	ülüs	 lands,	as	 they	 seemed	 the	
most	 significant	 in	 terms	 of	 livelihoods	 and	 of	 the	 change	 from	 collective	 to	 individual	
farming.	 	 Table	 2	 presents	 the	main	 variables,	measures	 and	data	 collection	 techniques	
that	I	used	throughout	the	research.	
	
Table	2	 Main	issues	and	aspects	of	inquiry,	and	data	collection	techniques	
Main	Issues		 Data	collection	techniques	
Location	of	land	(head/middle/tail)	
Existence	of	alternative	water	supply	
(rainwater	and	well)	
Interviews	with	local	authorities	
(water	managers);	semi-structured	
interviews	with	farmers;	transect	
walks	and	observations	
	
Size	of	group	 Interviews	with	farmers;	transect	
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Socio-cultural	and	economic	heterogeneity	
(gender,	religion,	ethnicity,	wealth)	
Livelihood	strategies	
walks	and	observation	
De	jure	rights	on	international,	national	and	
regional	and	local	levels		
Interviews	with	local	authorities	
(water	managers);	study	of	
literature	
Local	rules	regulating	use	and	management	
of	I&D	system	(regulation	of	access,	
monitoring,	penalties	for	free-riding);	
De	facto	rights;		
Characteristics	of	institutions	that	guide	I&D	
management	(including	violations,	
frequency	of	free-riding	behaviour);	
Characteristics	of	collective	labour	input	and	
of	spontaneous	cooperation;	
Characteristics	of	decision-making	
Literature	review;	transect	walks	
and	observations;		
in-depth	interviews;	interviews	
with	local	authorities	
	
	
Due	to	the	large	number	of	interviews	and	the	diversity	of	data,	I	chose	to	code	the	data	by	
hand.		Transcription	of	each	of	the	interviews	was	followed	by	arranging	the	information	on	
an	excel	sheet,	under	various	categories	and	sub-categories.		These	columns	of	groups	and	
sub-groups	later	provided	a	practical	way	to	review	all	the	information	collected	under	one	
category	and	draw	various	conclusions.		I	choose	data	for	citation	based	on	the	ability	of	it	
to	 convey	 and	 support	 arguments	 that	 were	 present	 in	 other	 interviews	 but	 not	 so	
forcefully.	 	 Citations	 that	 described	 some	 unique	 phenomena	 (for	 example	 free-riding)	
were	also	chosen.	
3.2	 Study	area		
 
The	 fieldwork	 took	place	 in	 the	 Ferghana	Valley	 in	 Central	 Asia	 (Figure	 1).	 	 The	370	 km	
long	and	190	km	wide	Ferghana	Valley	is	the	largest	valley	in	Central	Asia.		The	area	forms	
part	of	the	Syr	Darya	basin,	which,	together	with	the	Amu	Darya	basin	makes	up	the	Aral	
Sea	basin.		The	region	is	semi-arid.		Average	annual	precipitation	at	the	research	location	
ranges	 between	 500	 and	 750	 mm,	 much	 of	 which	 falls	 between	 October	 and	 April	
(AQUASTAT).	 	The	 soil	 is	siernozem	 in	 complex	with	alluvial	 soils.	 	 The	vegetation	 in	 the	
Kyrgyz	 Ferghana	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 Water	 Resources	 eAtlas	 (no	 date)	 as	
cropland/natural	vegetation	mosaic.		Natural	vegetation,	including	some	extensive	walnut	
and	evergreen	forests,	is	more	characteristic	to	the	foothills	of	the	mountains	in	the	area,	
while	low-lying	regions,	such	as	the	research	location,	are	heavily	cultivated	and	irrigated.		
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Figure	1	 The	research	location		
	
	Carthography:	Marc	Girard	and	Blanka	Füleki,	Université	de	Montréal,	2016		
	
Irrigation	water	at	the	research	location	is	retained	by	the	Andijan	Reservoir,	which	itself	
is	fed	by	the	Kara	Darya.		The	Andijan	reservoir	was	built	in	1975.		Its	total	storage	capacity	
is	1	750	million	m3.4		Although	the	rivers	that	feed	the	reservoir	and	the	greater	part	of	the	
reservoir’s	 territory	 lies	 in	 Kyrgyz	 territory,	 the	 reservoir’s	 outlets	 are	 controlled	 by	
Uzbekistan,	which	gives	five	percent	of	the	total	amount	of	water	stored	by	the	reservoir	
to	Kyrgyzstan.5		The	actual	amount	fluctuates	according	to	the	amount	of	water	available	
                                                
4	Author’s	interview	with	official	of	OblVodKhoz,	July,	2008.	
5	Author’s	interview	with	habitant	of	Munduz,	May,	2008.		
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in	the	reservoir6.		Depending	on	the	weather	conditions,	sometimes	more	is	allocated	and	
sometimes	less.		The	water	allocated	for	Kyrgyzstan	is	conveyed	via	an	open	surface	lined	
canal,	named	Kara	Darinskia	Obidnjaesy,	(“KDO”).		Its	capacity	is	34	m3/sec.		A	number	of	
larger	and	smaller	(0.3	m3/sec	and	0.6	m3/sec)	secondary,	also	called	distributary,	canals	
brunch	off	 the	KDO.	 	One	 such	 canal	 is	 the	Zsijde-Mazar	 canal.	 	 It	 delivers	water	 to	 the	
villages	within	 the	 study	 area.	 	 Its	 capacity	 is	 2.2	m3/sec.	 	 Its	 length	 is	 49,77	 km	 and	 it	
irrigates	1	048	hectares	of	land.			
	
The	Ferghana	valley	forms	the	backbone	of	agriculture	in	Central	Asia.		All	three	countries,	
Uzbekistan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	parts	of	which	are	situated	in	the	Ferghana	Valley,	
are	 predominantly	 agricultural.	 	 As	 the	 area	 is	 populous,	 there	 are	 high	 pressures	 on	
limited	land	resources,	notably	in	Kyrgyzstan	where	agriculture	employs	53%	of	the	labour	
force.	 	 Agriculture	 overwhelmingly	 relies	 on	 irrigation	 and	 some	 45%	 of	 the	 irrigation	
areas	 of	 the	 Syr-Darya	 basin	 are	 located	 in	 the	 valley.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 importance	 of	
agriculture	to	the	economy,	people	depend	a	great	deal	on	seasonal	climate	and	weather	
conditions	for	adequate	amounts	of	water	for	irrigation.		In	addition	to	water	availability,	
access	 to	 water,	 water	 quality,	 rising	 groundwater	 and	 waterlogging	 are	 the	 main	
problems	 that	 the	 area	 is	 dealing	 with	 (UNEP	 2005).	 	 The	 border	 regions	 between	
Kyrgyzstan	 and	 Uzbekistan	 (including	 the	 research	 location)	 are	 particularly	 prone	 to	
problems	related	to	water	availability	and	access,	the	irrigation	infrastructure	having	been	
built	when	the	borders	were	only	administrative	divisions.		Tension	over	the	availability	or	
allocation	of	water	 is	frequent	and	mainly	arises	between	local	communities	(sometimes	
between	cross-border	communities),	and	district	and	regional	authorities.		Figure	2	shows	
some	of	the	water	issues	in	the	Ferghana	Valley	in	general	and	at	the	research	location	in	
particular.	
	
	
	
	
                                                
6	Author’s	interview	with	official	of	OblVodKhoz,	July,	2008.	
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Figure	2	 Issues	related	to	water	in	the	research	area	
	
Source:	UNEP/ARENDAL	(2005)		
 
This	 research	 concerns	 itself	 with	 irrigation	 water	 management	 in	 two	 of	 the	 villages	
situated	 along	 the	 Zsijde-Mazar	 canal:	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	 (Figure	 1).	 	 Both	 villages	 are	
located	 close	 to	 the	 border	 with	 Uzbekistan	 and	 depend	 on	 seasonal	 water	 allocation	
determined	by	the	climate	and	agreements	between	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan.	 	Of	 the	
two	villages,	Zsijde	is	located	closer	to	head	of	the	irrigation	system.		In	2005,	607	families	
(3	226	persons)	 lived	 in	 the	 village.	 	 The	number	of	hectare	of	 land	 that	belongs	 to	 the	
villagers	 is	 728.	 	 Of	 that,	 78	 hectares	 are	 ogorods,	 where	 people	 grow	 grain,	 corn	 and	
vegetables.		Beside	the	ogorods,	people	have	access	to	ülüs	and	arenda	lands.		Munduz	is	
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situated	 further	downstream	 from	Zsijde	along	 the	 canal.	 	 In	2005,	365	 families	 lived	 in	
Munduz	and	 its	population	was	1	685.	 	The	total	area	of	agricultural	 land	owned	by	the	
families	is	389	hectares.	 	Of	that,	68	hectares	are	ogorod	 lands,	248,71	hectares	are	ülüs	
lands	 and	 72,29	 hectares	 are	 arenda.	 	 There	 are	 approximately	 100	 hectares	 of	 empty	
lands	where	cultivation	is	not	possible	because	of	the	shortage	of	irrigation	water.	
3.3	 Limitations	
	
During	 fieldwork,	 I	 mainly	 to	 observe	 irrigation	 water	 management	 by	 farmers.	 	 As	 the	
employees	of	the	WUA	were	mostly	absent	from	the	field,	there	is	a	risk	that	I	focused	too	
much	 on	 the	 farmer’s	 practices	 and	 perspectives	 and	 too	 little	 on	 those	 of	 the	
representatives	of	 farmer’s	 organisations.	 	On	 the	other	hand,	 apart	 from	 the	occasional	
presence	of	the	main	murab	whom	I	interviewed	several	times,	the	fact	that	the	WUA	did	
not	take	part	in	the	everyday	irrigation	practices	of	the	farmers	tells	a	lot	about	its	capacity	
to	represent	farmers’	needs.		
	
My	 data	 about	 irrigation	 water	 availability	 and	 issues	 regarding	 management	 is	 mainly	
based	on	interviews	and	discussions	with	water	users	and	thus	reflect	the	perception	of	the	
users.	 	 While	 I	 used	 some	 secondary	 data	 –	 records	 on	 crops,	 water	 duties	 –	 that	 was	
provided	to	me	by	the	WUA,	the	RayVodKhoz	and	the	OblVodKhoz,	 I	did	not	perform	any	
independent	measurements.		Independent	measurements	would	have	been	a	scientifically	
valid	way	to	verify	especially	 irrigation	water	supplies	and	 farmers’	perceptions	regarding	
scarcities.		
	
My	identity	as	a	foreigner	and	a	female	caused	certain	limitations.	 	Some	members	of	the	
community	saw	me	as	a	westerner	empowered	with	means	and	opportunities	to	help	the	
community	 and	 individuals	 in	 certain	 endeavours.	 	 That	 impression,	 I	 learnt	 later,	was	 a	
legacy	of	 international	aid	organisations	 in	the	era,	which,	upon	visiting	the	communities,	
brought	money	 and	 projects.	 	 Nor	was	my	 participation	 as	 a	 researcher	 neutral.	 	 Rapley	
(2004)	 writes	 that	 there	 is	 in	 fact	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 neutrality	 in	 an	 interviewee	 and	
interviewer	relationship.		Interviewing	is	inherently	biased	through	the	overarching	control	
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of	 the	 interviewers	 “through	 questions,	 silence	 and	 responses	 tokens	 (e.g.	 ‘okay’)	 and	
chiefly	 they	 decide	 which	 particular	 part	 of	 the	 answer	 to	 follow	 up”	 (Watson	 and	
Weinberg	1982	cited	in	Clive	et	al.	2004).	As	a	woman,	I	was	not	completely	free	in	moving	
around.	 	Many	 farmers	 guarded	 their	 water	 at	 night	 as	 freeriding	 occurred	 then.	 	 I	 was	
soon	made	aware	 that	 that	part	of	 the	day	was	“off-limits”	 to	me	 to	make	observations.		
My	informants	considered	it	inappropriate	for	me	to	go	as	a	woman	to	the	fields	at	night.		
These	limitations	turned	out	to	be	inherent	sources	of	bias	in	the	research.	
	
One	of	the	factors	that	limited	my	participation	most	was	my	limited	knowledge	of	Russian	
and	 ignorance	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 language.	 	 Although	 with	 time	 my	 Russian	 language	 skills	
improved	 greatly,	 I	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 an	 interpreter	 whenever	 I	 wanted	 to	 engage	 in	
conversations	 with	 the	 users	 and	 other	 members	 of	 the	 community.	 	 I	 designed	 the	
questionnaire	 in	 English	 and	 the	 interpreter	 translated	 it	 during	 the	 interviews.	 	 Farmers	
responded	 in	Russian	and	 the	 interpreter	 translated	 the	 responses	 into	English.	 	Working	
with	 an	 interpreter	 paused	 certain	 limitations.	 It	 certainly	 paused	 the	 challenge	 of	
understanding	correctly	 the	meaning	of	 the	 interviews,	merely	because	what	was	told	by	
the	 interviewee	was	not	only	filtered	or	 interpreted	by	me	but	by	a	second	person	too,	a	
challenge	and	limitation	that	I	was	constantly	aware	of.	
	
Conducting	 the	 fieldwork	 during	 the	 irrigation	 season,	 although	 beneficial	 from	 certain	
perspectives	that	 I	mentioned	earlier,	also	created	certain	 limitations.	 	Farmers	tended	to	
be	 extremely	 busy	 and	many	 did	 not	 have	 time	 for	 interviews.	 	 In	 other	 cases,	 farmers	
simply	refused	to	be	interviewed.		This	certainly	limited	a	choice	of	interviewees.		Despite	
those	limitations,	 I	attempted	to	collect	 information	from	individuals	belonging	to	various	
age	groups,	gender,	wealth	status	and	ethnicity	as	well	as	 from	marginalized	members	of	
the	community.		
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Chapter	4		 The	changing	political	geography	and	its	
impact	on	irrigation	management	in	the	
Ferghana	Valley	
 
In	 this	 chapter,	 first	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 landscape	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	
Ferghana	 is	presented.	 	Next,	 the	ways	these	changes	have	 impacted	 irrigation	water	use	
and	management	are	looked	at.		A	reflection	on	formal	and	informal	irrigation	institutions	
transformed	as	a	result	of	IMT	also	forms	part	of	this	chapter.		
 
4.1	 Political,	economic	transformations	in	the	Ferghana	
Valley	
 
The	 Ferghana	 valley	 has	 been	 an	 important	 centre	 of	 irrigated	 agriculture	 since	 ancient	
times.	 	 Irrigation	 in	 the	 valley	 has	 been	 a	 crucial	 determinant	 not	 only	 for	 economic	
development	 but	 also	 in	 shaping	 the	 culture	 and	 politics	 of	 the	 region.	 	 Irrigated	
agriculture	dates	back	as	far	as	the	second	century	BC.		The	era	preceding	collectivization	
(until	 the	 mid	 1930s)	 was	 characterized	 by	 decentralized	 and	 small-scale	 subsistence	
agriculture.		The	major	crops	at	this	time	were	mainly	wheat,	sorghum,	barley,	millet,	rice	
and	alfalfa	but	fruits	and	vegetables	were	also	grown.			
	
The	first	documented	large	investments	into	the	irrigation	infrastructure	was	made	by	the	
Kokand	 Khanate	 established	 in	 1709.	 	 The	 Khanate	 upgraded	 irrigation	 infrastructure	
along	major	urban	centres	primarily	but	also	opened	up	new	lands	in	the	southeast	of	the	
valley	 settling	 previously	 nomad	 populations	 (Bichsel	 2009).	 	 The	 nineteenth-century	
Russian	administrator	and	scholar	Aleksandr	Fedorovich	Middendorf	writes	about	this	era	
that:		
“[…]	 over	 thousands	 of	 years	 the	 populace	 had	 constructed	 huge	 water	
channels,	 carried	 out	 large-scale	 fertilization	 and	 planted	 whole	 forests	 of	
shade-giving	 trees	 for	 fruits	 and	 wood,	 with	 ‘each	 individual	 tree	 being	 in	
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need	of	life-giving	water’.		The	Kokandis	planted	fields	of	wheat,	barley,	millet	
sorghum,	corn,	rice	beans,	sesame,	flax,	hemp,	cotton,	and	alfalfa	while	their	
gardens	 included	 melons,	 water	 melons,	 cucumbers,	 pumpkins,	 grapes,	
apricots,	 peaches,	 apples,	 pears,	 quinces,	 nuts,	 plums,	 cherries,	 not	 to	
mention	onions,	carrots,	beets	and	other	produce.	 	The	main	grain	crop	was	
wheat,	 which	 Kirghiz	 cattle	 ranchers	 raised	 on	 the	 lower	 slopes	 of	 the	 Alai	
range	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 side	 business.	 […].	 	 The	 expansion	 of	 irrigation	 after	 the	
early	 eighteenth	 century	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 villages	 and	 reduced	 the	
area	available	 for	grazing.	 	 Cotton	growing	always	had	held	a	 special	 place	
throughout	 the	Kokand	Khanate,	but	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century	 farmers	also	
began	cultivating	American	long-fibred	hybrids.	(Middendorf	1882:	p.	11–12)		
	
In	1876,	the	Tsarist	Russian	troops	invaded	and	abolished	the	Khanate	integrating	much	of	
its	territory	into	the	Ferghana	Oblast	of	the	General	Governate	of	Turkestan.		The	Tsarist	
administration	 promoted	 cotton	 for	 export	 within	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 textile	 industry	
(Bichsel	2009).	 	The	administration	envisaged	in	this	area	a	fertile,	 irrigated,	cotton	oasis	
of	major	dimensions	and,	indeed,	between	1885	and	1916,	cotton	production	expanded	in	
the	territory.			
	
From	1917,	the	Soviet	 leadership	transformed	Central	Asia.	 	 It	divided	existing	territorial	
units	integrating	them	into	new	republics	and	bringing	them	under	one	political	union.		It	
reorganized	 the	 population	 of	 the	 valley	 along	 major	 groups	 –	 the	 Uzbeks,	 Tajiks	 and	
Kyrgyz	in	the	Ferghana	Valley.		While	beforehand	the	inhabitants	may	have	subscribed	to	
various	 identities,	 the	 ethnic	 identities	 that	 Soviet	 officials	 determined	 at	 this	 time	
became	 official	 ethnicities	 and,	 later	 on,	 nationalities.	 	 Political	 and	 societal	
transformation	occurred	alongside	the	reorganisation	of	the	economy,	the	collectivization	
of	 productive	 resources	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 central	 planning	 under	 state	
management.			
	
The	Soviet	leadership	further	expanded	cotton	production.		From	1927,	irrigated	land	was	
expanded	 through	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 “highly	 integrated	 water	 distribution	 and	
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irrigation	networks”	(O’Hara	2000).		In	Central	Asia,	including	the	Ferghana	Valley,	a	total	
of	7.5	million	ha	of	land	was	brought	under	irrigation,	much	of	which	was	located	in	semi-
dry	 and	 dry	 areas	 (O’Hara	 2000).	 	 The	 Soviet	 Union,	 transformed	 agriculture	 by	
collectivization	 and	 forming	 collective	 farms	 (Russ.	 kolkhoz)	 and	 state	 farms	 (Russ.	
sovkhoz).		Both	the	shovkoz	and	the	kolkhoz	were	subordinate	to	the	state.		The	irrigation	
infrastructure	 developed	 during	 the	 Soviet	 Era	 is	 characterized	 by	 “a	 complex	 and	
hierarchical	network	of	rivers,	reservoirs,	weirs,	major	canals,	sub-canals,	pipes,	valves	and	
furrows”	that	“been	built	up	over	the	past	70	years	and	is	deeply	embedded	–	literally	and	
metaphorically	–	in	the	landscape	of	the	Fergana	Valley.”		This	complex	infrastructure	was	
managed	 –	 operated	 and	 maintained	 by	 a	 hierarchical	 administration	 with	 the	 Soviet	
Ministry	of	Land	Reclamation	and	Water	Resources	 (minvodkoz)	at	 the	highest	 level	and	
the	 regional	 water	 resources	 management	 departments	 supporting	 it.	 	 Water	
management	was	governed	based	on	a	territorial	approach	rather	than	along	hydraulic	or	
catchment-based	principles.		
	
On	 independence	 in	 1991,	 Kyrgyzstan	undertook	 several	 reforms	 in	 the	 agricultural	 and	
irrigation	sectors.		A	new	Land	Code	was	adopted	in	1999,	which	allows	state,	communal	
and	 individual	 ownership	 of	 land	 (Lindberg	 no	 date).	 	 The	 Land	 Redistribution	 Fund,	
administered	 first	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Land	 and	 Water	 Resources	 and	 later	 by	 village	
governments,	 set	 aside	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 kolkhoz	 and	 shovkoz	 lands	 to	 the	 state	 and	
redistributed	 the	 remaining	 75	 percent	 to	 previous	 members	 of	 the	 collective	 or	 state	
farms.		The	amount	of	land	that	was	distributed	to	individuals	depended	on	the	number	of	
people	 living	 in	 a	 village,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 farm	 and	 the	 number	 of	 years	 an	 individual	
worked	on	a	collective	farm.		Initially	the	new	farms	were	medium	sized,	but,	by	2004,	due	
to	 orientation	 in	 agriculture	 towards	 small-scale	 farming,	 the	 large	 number	 of	 peasant	
farms	 emerged,	 accounting	 for	 nearly	 the	 quarter	 of	 the	 country’s	 agricultural	 lands.		
Between	1992	and	2002,	 the	number	of	peasant	 farms	 increased	 from	4	100	 to	84	700	
(Spoor	 2004).	 	 The	 size	 of	 landholdings	 varies	 between	 one	 hectare/person	 to	 0.1	
hectare/person.	 	 The	 smallest	 landholdings	 are	 located	 in	 the	 Ferghana	 Valley,	 where	
population	is	the	densest.			
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As	a	result	of	the	location	of	parts	of	the	waste	irrigation	system	in	many	countries	(and	
hence	 administrative	 regions)	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 crops,	 the	 three	 countries	 that	
occupy	the	valley	now	have	to	cope	with	sharing	the	water	across	border	and	allocating	
water	 in	country	among	myriads	of	small	producers	and	subsistence	 farmers.	 	However,	
the	 physical	 structure	 of	 the	 irrigation	 network,	 its	 dimension	 and	 sheer	 size,	 limits	 the	
options	for	alternatives	and	it	is	proving	ill	equipped	to	adapt	to	increasing	crop	diversity.	
	
Others	add	that	the	design	and	state	of	I&D	infrastructure	represent	further	obstacles	to	
satisfying	 growing	 demands.	 	 An	 irrigation	 management	 system	 that	 was	 designed	 to	
deliver	 water	 to	 monocropping,	 cotton-growing	 collective	 farms	 must	 now	 satisfy	 the	
needs	of	hundreds	of	 individual	 farmers	with	the	freedom	to	cultivate	the	crops	of	their	
choice.	 	 Thurman	 (2003)	writes	 that	 the	 I&D	 infrastructure	 that	 the	 newly	 independent	
states	inherited	was	already	in	a	poor	condition	during	the	late	years	of	the	Soviet	Union.		
Since	 independence,	due	to	the	reduction	 in	state	 funding	“to	almost	nothing”	 (Johnson	
III,	Stoutjesdijk	and	Djailobayev	2002)	and	to	the	lack	of	capacity	of	the	farmers	to	invest	
in	 infrastructure,	 the	 state	 of	 infrastructure	 has	 continued	 to	 deteriorate.	 	 As	 a	 result,	
significantly	less	water	reaches	the	farms	today	than	in	the	years	of	Soviet	management.			
	
4.2	 Institutional	transformations	in	irrigation	management		
 
Before	the	Tsarist	era,	the	murab,	or	the	“water	controller”,	managed	the	distribution	of	
water	on	the	local	scale.		He	was	overseen	by	the	village	elder	chosen	by	the	community.		
In	the	highest	levels	of	government,	the	chief	murab	was	responsible	for	water	allocation	
and	distribution.	 	All	users	were	required	to	take	part	 in	the	maintenance	of	canals,	and	
they	 were	 also	 expected	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 water	 they	 used.	 	 Local-level	 management	
institutions	were	strong	and	well	adapted	to	their	environments;	each	settlement	had	its	
rules	as	to	who	has	access	to	and	control	over	the	resource	(O’Hara	1998).		
	
Collectivization	meant	 the	eradication	of	 traditional	 forms	of	 farming.	 	While	 the	Tsarist	
system	 integrated	 traditional	 institutions	 and	 organisations	 in	 its	 own	 system	 (Bischel	
2006),	the	Soviet	administration	believed	that	full	productivity	could	not	be	achieved	until	
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the	 inhabitants	of	Central	Asia	had	dropped	 their	old	 traditions	and	adopted	new	ones7	
(Wheeler	1955).		Therefore,	the	Soviet	administration	took	water	management	“out	of	the	
hands	 of	 traditional	 elders	 and	 councils	 with	 whom	 it	 resided”	 (O’Hara	 2000:	 p.430),	
placing	 it	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Amelioration	 and	 Water	 Resources,	
founded	in	1928.			
	
Some	the	traditional	institutions,	such	as	the	Elders’	Council	and	the	ashar,	persisted	and	
functioned	in	parallel	to	the	Soviet	administration.		The	Elders’	Council	is	made	up	almost	
always	 of	men	 and	 from	 the	 older	 generation.	 	 The	most	 significant	 role	 of	 the	 Elders’	
Council	 was	 dispute	 resolution	 within	 and	 between	 communities.	 	 They	 are	 also	
authorized	to	represent	the	interest	and	speak	for	the	community.	 	Ashar	 is	a	traditional	
form	 of	 cooperation	 where	 “groups	 of	 people	 are	 mobilized	 to	 assist	 construction	 and	
maintenance	 tasks	of	a	 collectivity”	 (Bischel	2006:	p.108).	 	 It	 lost	 its	 voluntary	 character	
when	 it	 became	 obligatory	 collective	 labour	 (Russ.	 subbotnik)	 under	 the	 Soviet	
administration.	 	 While	 ashar	 is	 helpful	 in	 mobilizing	 communities	 for	 collective	 action,	
there	is	evidence	that	it	in	itself	is	not	a	democratic	practice.		Traditionally,	ashar	is	called	
by	the	local	ayil	okmotu	and	it	decides	when,	where	and	how	the	collective	work	will	take	
place	(Giffen	no	date).			
	
In	2002,	shortly	after	independence,	Parliament	adopted	the	“Law	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	
on	Unions	(Associations)	of	Water	Users	#38”	(the	“Law”)	and	formalized	WUAs.		Through	
the	Law,	it	established	communal	ownership	regime	of	the	I&D	systems	and	gave	formal	
rights	to	manage	the	resource	to	members	of	WUAs.		The	Law	defines	a	WUA	as	“a	non-
commercial	organisation	that	acts	 in	the	public	 interest	for	the	purpose	of	operating	and	
maintaining	 a	 specific	 irrigation	 system	 so	 as	 to	 provide	 the	 owners	 and	 users	 of	
agricultural	 land	 with	 irrigation	 water”	 (Law	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 on	 Unions	
(Associations)	of	Water	Users	#38:	2002).	 	 The	 tasks	of	 the	WUA	are	 the	operation	and	
maintenance	 (rehabilitation	and	 improvement)	of	 the	 irrigation	 infrastructure	and	water	
                                                
7	According	to	Wheeler	(1955)	this	notion	is	an	essential	feature	of	Marxism,	“but	it	has	particular	
force	 when	 applied	 to	 a	 people	 whose	 culture	 is	 largely	 Islamic,	 for	 the	 Russians	 believe	 that	
Islam	is	far	less	compatible	with	modern	methods	than	Christendom”.	
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distribution	 (Law	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 on	 Unions	 (Associations)	 of	 Water	 Users	 #38:	
2002).			
	
The	organisational	structure	of	a	typical	WUA	is	shown	in	Figure	3.		
 
Figure 3 WUA organisational structure  
 
Source:	IWMI	and	SIC	ICWC	2003	
 
The	Law	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	on	Unions	(Associations)	of	Water	Users	(2002)	guarantees	
the	following	rights	to	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA:	
• the	right	to	distribute	water;	
• the	right	to	operate	and	maintain	the	infrastructure	within	the	WUA	service	area;	
• the	 right	 to	 rehabilitate	 and	 improve	 irrigation	 systems	within	 the	WUA	 service	
area	and	undertake	construction	work	as	necessary;		
• the	right	to	purchase	water	for	distribution	within	the	service	area.		
	
Other	 rights	 are	 the	 right	 to	mobilize	 financial	 resources	 in	 the	 form	 of	 water	 fees	 (or	
water	duties	 –	 to	determine	 rates	 to	 cover	 fees	determined	by	 the	water	 suppliers	 and	
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fees	needed	to	cover	O&M	and	to	collect	the	fees),	to	impose	fines	and	sanctions	on	those	
who	do	not	abide	by	its	rules	and	regulations	and	to	exclude	members.	
	
The	members	of	WUAs	are	those	“entities”	that	own	agricultural	land	in	the	service	area	
of	a	certain	WUA.		“Entities”	who	lease	agricultural	land	may	also	become	members	of	a	
WUA,	but	only	on	 the	condition	 that	 they	hold	a	 lease	 the	 length	of	which	 is	more	 that	
three	years,	 and	obtain	 the	written	permission	of	 the	 landowner	 to	become	a	member.		
Members	pay	water	duty	to	the	WUA.		This	income	is	paid	as	salary	to	the	employees	of	
the	WUA	and	invested	in	the	maintenance	of	the	irrigation	infrastructure	on	the	level	of	
the	distributary	canal.			
	
According	 to	 the	 Law,	 and	 in	 theory,	 WUAs	 are	 democratic	 grass-root	 organisations.		
Members	have	rights	to	full	participation	in	the	establishment	and	operation	of	the	WUA	
and	to	participate	in	the	decision-making	processes.		They	are	to	receive	free	information	
pertaining	to	the	management	of	the	irrigation	system.		Moreover,	according	to	the	Law,	
members	 are	 ensured	 “faire	 and	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 irrigation	 water”	 as	 well	 as	
environmental	 security	 (Law	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 on	 Unions	 (Associations)	 of	 Water	
Users	 #38:	 2002).	 	 In	 addition,	 through	membership	 in	 the	WUA,	 farmers	may	 gain	 the	
following	benefits:		
• equitable	water	 distribution	 among	 farmers	 regardless	 of	 their	 location,	 type	 of	
farm,	or	size	of	the	farm;	
• more	reliable	water	supply;	
• water	supply	becomes	more	responsive	to	crop	needs;	
• quick	dispute	resolution	at	the	local	level;	
• well-maintained	canals;	
• more	control	over	water	theft/	stealing	(IWMI	and	SIC	ICWC	2003).	
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Chapter	5	 Results,	analysis	and	interpretation	
 
For	most	households	that	inhabit	the	research	area	and,	indeed	the	larger	Ferghana	Valley,	
access	to	irrigation	water	is	vital.		In	the	semi-arid	region	in	which	the	study	area	is	located,	
farming,	on	which	most	of	 the	habitants	 rely	 to	some	degree	 for	 their	 livelihoods,	 is	only	
possible	 with	 the	 use	 of	 irrigation	 water.	 	 In	 Chapter	 5,	 I	 discuss	 contemporary	 rural	
livelihoods	in	the	research	area	and	the	importance	of	farming	as	one	of	the	strategies	for	
making	a	living.		The	research	focuses	on	irrigation	water	management	on	ülüs	and	arenda	
lands.		An	analysis	of	the	impacts	of	land	redistribution	in	the	villages	is	presented	as	well	
as	the	land	and	water	access	that	were	created.		Next,	an	analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	
data	on	irrigation	water	management	by	formal	and	informal	institution	is	undertaken.		
 
5.1	 Rural	livelihoods	and	household	economics	
 
Sixty-three	percent	of	the	population	in	the	Kyrgyz	republic	lives	in	rural	areas	in	relative	
poverty.	 	 The	 southern	 regions	 of	 Kyrgyzstan,	 including	 the	 research	 location	 has	 the	
highest	density	of	 rural	population.	 	Due	 to	 the	economic	downturn	and	 the	collapse	of	
the	 industrial	 sector	 since	 independence,	 poverty	 has	 grown	 significantly,	 especially	 in	
rural	areas.		According	to	the	country’s	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(Government	of	
the	 Kyrgyz	 Republic	 2002),	 in	 2001,	 51	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 was	 considered	 poor	
and,	of	that,	15,6	percent	extremely	poor.		
	
Rural	 households8	 adjusted	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 changes	 that	 accompanied	
independence	by	diversifying	their	 livelihoods	activities.	 	 In	addition	to	 jobs	 in	the	public	
sector,	business,	economic	migration	has	become	an	important	contributor	to	household	
                                                
8 According to Kandiyoti (1999), the definition of a household must always be adjusted to local 
circumstances.  In the case, household includes various generations - parents, children, including 
married, daughter-in-laws and grandchildren living together in the same household. Girls, when they 
get married, move to their husband’s family.  While girls leave the parental household, boys, usually 
the youngest, looks after the parents in their old age.  Daughter-in-laws may also contribute to the 
household income by working as teachers or nurses and in the fields.  
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economies.		Sending	a	male	member	of	the	family	to	work	in	construction	and	mining	in	
Russia	can	contribute	as	much	as	$100	per	month	on	average	(Laruelle	2007)	to	the	family	
budget,	although	often	the	earnings	are	saved	up	by	young	adults	to	build	a	house	or	pay	
for	wedding	 and	 only	 a	 part	 of	 the	 remittances	 is	 contributed	 to	 household	 spendings.		
Laruelle	(2007)	writes	that	of	the	300	000	migrants	that	the	Kyrgyz	government	officially	
recognized,	 90	 percent	 are	 from	 southern	 regions,	 including	 the	 Jalal-Abad	 oblast,	 that	
was	particularly	hard-hit	during	the	post-Soviet	changes.		
	
In	many	households	with	access	to	land,	agriculture	has	become	a	subsistence	activity	to	
complement	 income-generating	 activities.	 	 Much	 of	 what	 is	 grown	 is	 used	 within	 the	
household	as	safety	net.		For	example,	despite	the	low	market	value	of	the	cotton,	almost	
everyone	 in	 my	 sample	 cultivates	 some.	 	 Cotton	 is	 not	 only	 a	 cash	 crop	 but	 also	 a	
subsistence	 crop.	 	 It	 is	used	 for	oil,	 for	 carpet-making	and	provides	material	 for	heating	
and	cooking.		Rice,	due	to	its	high	value	in	the	market,	constitutes	a	safety	net	for	families:	
if	 they	 can	 afford	 it,	 families	will	 store	 the	 rice	 until	 the	winter.	 	 In	 the	winter,	when	 a	
household	is	in	need	for	money	and	rice	is	in	short	supply,	the	families	will	raise	funds	by	
selling	their	rice	in	the	market.		
	
While	during	the	Soviet	period	the	state	determined	the	types	and	amount	of	crops	grown	
on	 collective	 farms.	 	 The	 state	 no	 longer	 determines	 how	much	 of	 each	 crop	 a	 farmer	
should	or	must	grow	nor	does	 the	WUA	advise	 farmers	 regarding	 the	choice	of	crops	 in	
order	 to	ensure	the	sustainability	of	water	supply	 in	 the	region.	 	 Instead,	each	 farmer	 is	
able	to	decide	what	kind	of	crops	he/she	will	grow	and	on	how	many	hectares	or	sotiks.		
At	the	research	location,	the	main	crops	are	rice,	cotton,	corn	and	grains.		In	backyard	or	
kitchen	gardens,	people	grow	vegetables	and	have	small	orchards.		Figures	4	and	5	show	
the	crops	most	commonly	grown	in	the	two	research	communities.		
  
 
 
 
 
	 49	
Figure 4 Diversity in crops in Zsijde 
 
Source:  Author’s interviews (2008). 
 
 
Figure 5 Diversity in crops in Munduz 
 
Source:		Author’s	interviews	(2008).	
 
In	terms	of	division	of	labour	within	the	households,	men	are,	in	general,	responsible	for	
physically	demanding	work,	including	irrigation,	and	women	usually	do	the	weeding.		The	
head	 of	 household	 is	 responsible	 for	 looking	 after	 water	 and	 for	 constructing	 canals	
(important	 especially	 for	 rice).	 	 Rice,	 the	 most	 valuable	 crop	 on	 the	 market,	 is	 mainly	
looked	after	by	men,	because	it	needs	constant	watering	and	building	of	basins	that	retain	
water,	which	is	considered	hard	physical	work.		A	notable	exception	is	the	still	functioning	
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Shirin	 cooperative	 farm	 located	 within	 the	 research	 area,	 where	 women	 organize	 the	
irrigation	of	1.5	hectares	of	rice.	 	Widows	and	their	sons	also	organize	irrigation	on	their	
lands.	 	 As	 the	 children	 grow	 up,	 they	 receive	 responsibilities	 for	 certain	 jobs	 in	 the	
household.	 	Young	boys	 look	after	the	cows	and	watch	the	water	 in	the	field,	while	girls	
will	weed,	cook	and	clean.		As	older	youth,	especially	young	men,	increasingly	migrate	to	
Russia,	girls	and	the	elderly	tend	to	look	after	the	crops.		
	
Beside	 small	 landowners,	 there	 are	 a	 few	 big	 landowners	 to	 whom	 farming	 is	 less	 a	
survival	strategy	and	more	an	economic	opportunity.		Agricultural	entrepreneurs	purchase	
land	use	rights	from	those	who	do	not	or	cannot	cultivate	their	lands.		Entrepreneurs	look	
for	and	purchase	quality	lands	determined	by	the	quality	of	the	soil	and	by	the	availability	
and	proximity	of	a	reliable	water	supply.		While	some	entrepreneurs	only	grow	rice,	others	
will	diversify	 into	various	fruits	and	vegetables,	which	they	sell	 in	nearby	markets	and	as	
far	as	Bishkek.			
	
Nizamendinkhodjayeva	 (no	 date)	 looked	 into	 the	 importance	 of	 irrigation	 water	 for	
livelihoods	in	the	rural	regions	of	Kyrgyzstan,	Uzbekistan	and	Tajikistan.		According	to	her,	
access	 to	 irrigation	water	 is	 an	 essential	 resource	 to	meet	 the	 subsistence	 needs	 of	 the	
rural	 population,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 rural	 poor.	 	 	 Irrigation	water	 is	 an	 essential	 input	 in	
activities	 such	 as	 crop	 growing,	 poultry	 farming	 and	 livestock	 rearing.	 	 Due	 to	 increasing	
poverty,	there	has	been	a	change	in	agricultural	production	to	food	crops,	leading	to	higher	
water	 demands	 (Wegerich	 2001).	 	 Other	 important	 but	 non-farming	 livelihood	 activities,	
such	as	brick-making,	box-making,	baking	and	selling	bread	indirectly	depend	on	access	to	
water.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 due	 to	 the	 inability	 of	 farmers’	 organisations	 to	maintain	 the	
irrigation	and	drainage	systems,	about	260	000	ha	of	irrigated	land	has	been	abandoned	in	
Kyrgyzstan	(Dukhovny	2007)	and	many	farmers	experience	irrigation	water	shortages.			
 
5.2	 Household	access	to	land	and	irrigation	water	
 
The	contribution	 irrigated	agriculture	makes	 to	 the	household	economy	depends	on	 the	
amount	of	 land	 the	households	have	access	 to.	 	Access	 is	 in	 the	 form	of	ownership	and	
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rent.		The	size	of	the	lands	that	people	received	was	determined	based	on	the	amount	of	
land	 available	 in	 a	 certain	 area	 and	 on	 the	 density	 of	 the	 population.	 	 In	 Zsijde	 and	
Munduz,	 each	 habitant	 received	 14	 sotiks	 of	 land.	 	 These	 rather	 small	 sections	 of	
smallholders’	lands	(Kyrg.	ülüs)	are	usually	pooled	together	by	the	extended	family,	which	
means	 that	 each	 family	 in	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	owns	 approximately	 one	hectare	of	 land.		
Figure	 6	 shows	 that	 the	 size	 of	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 land	 (ülüs,	 arenda	and	ogorod)	 that	 the	
interviewees	own	is	between	one	and	five	hectares.		
 
Figure	6	 Size	of	lands	owned	by	the	interlocutors	in	Zsijde	and	Munduz	
	
Under	1	ha	 Between	1	and	5	ha	 Over	5	ha	
2	 28	 5	
 
The	 government	 also	 set	 aside	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 ex-kolkhoz	 and	 ex-shovkhoz	 lands	 as	
arenda	 land.		In	addition,	each	family	owns	a	small	kitchen	garden	that	is	usually	located	
next	 to	 the	 house	 and	where	 vegetables	 are	 grown	 and	 fruit	 trees	 are	 found.	 	 Various	
modes	 of	 farming	 are	 practiced,	 including	 individual	 peasant	 farms,	 family	 farms,	
cooperatives,	 joint	 stock	 companies	 and	 kitchen	gardening	 (Johnson	 III,	 Stoutjesdijk	 and	
Djailobayev	2002).			
	
The	 location	of	the	 land	relative	to	the	canal	and	water	access	point	determines	whether	
the	land	is	arable	and	the	kind	of	crops	that	are	possible	to	grow	on	it.		Although	the	land	
redistribution	appeared	to	most	of	the	interviewees	as	fair,	upon	inquiring	about	it	further,	
it	created	 its	“better-offs”	and	“worst-offs”	 in	terms	of	the	ownership	status,	size,	quality	
and	location	of	the	 land.	 	The	perception	among	farmers	whom	I	 interviewed	is	that	 land	
redistribution	 in	 1996	 was	 fair;	 most	 people	 were	 informed	 of	 their	 rights	 and	
responsibilities	and	they	all	received	equal	amounts	of	lands.		However,	it	is	clear	from	the	
interviews	 that	 some,	 who	 were	 better	 informed	 about	 the	 process,	 claimed	 lands	 for	
themselves	 and	 their	 relatives	 earlier	 than	 most	 farmers	 could	 and	 were	 also	 able	 to	
choose	the	location	of	their	land.		This	was	the	case	with	an	interviewee,	who,	when	asked	
about	the	land	redistribution,	said	that	he	received	15	hectares	of	ülüs	land	for	himself	(his	
family)	 and	 his	 relatives	 in	 1995.	 	 Having	 known	 about	 the	 shortage	 of	 water,	 he	 chose	
lands	that	are	 located	near	the	canal.	 	He	then	divided	the	 land	among	his	relatives.	 	 It	 is	
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most	 likely	 that	 inequalities	were	 facilitated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 changes	 from	 the	 collective	
system	to	individual	 land	ownership	took	years	to	complete,	giving	occasion	for	obtaining	
privileges	 by	 well-placed	 people	 and	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 everyone	 was	 equally	 well	
informed	about	the	land	redistribution	process.		
	
The	unequal	land	redistribution	reinforced	the	positions	of	the	rural	elite.		In	my	research,	
an	aksakal,	who	previously	occupied	a	high	position	in	the	Soviet	apparatus	and,	to	a	lesser	
extent,	 an	 oblast-level	 irrigation	 official,	 both	 gained	 privileges	 during	 the	 land	
redistribution	 that	 established	 their	 superior	 position	 vis-à-vis	 other	 farmers	 in	 terms	 of	
land	 ownership	 and	water	 access.	 	 One	 of	 them,	 due	 to	 the	 privileges	 that	 his	 previous	
position	offered	him,	was	not	only	able	to	purchase	extensive	 lands,	but	a	tractor	and	an	
underground	water	system,	through	which	he	can	provide	water	not	only	to	his	10	ha	but	
also	to	villagers	whose	lands	suffer	from	water	shortages	from	surface	canals.		
 
5.3	 Contemporary	institutional	context:	the	emergence	of	
formal	and	informal	institutions	
 
In	any	 irrigation	system,	parallel	 to	 the	physical	network,	a	network	of	social	actors	plays	
the	management	 role.	 	 This	 social	 network	 includes	everyone	 from	 those	 that	divide	 the	
water	at	the	head	of	the	system	to	the	field	level	users.		Along	the	Zsijde-Munduz	canal,	the	
Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	manages	the	irrigation	water	and	the	associated	infrastructure.		Within	
its	 territory,	 a	 number	 of	 informal	 institutions	 also	 play	 a	 part	 in	 irrigation	 water	
management.		In	this	section	of	the	study,	I	discuss	the	structure,	rules	and	activities	of	the	
Bek	 Abad	 Suu	 Water	 Users	 Association	 (“Bek	 Abad	 Suu	 WUA”),	 the	 only	 formal	
organisation	that	is	responsible	for	irrigation	water	management	in	the	research	territory.		
Next,	 I	 explore	 those	 institutions	 that	 are	 informal	 in	 nature	 as	 well	 as	 those	 that	 are	
spontaneous	 and	 look	 at	 what	 roles	 they	 fill	 in	 the	 management	 of	 irrigation	 water.		
Through	 the	 exploration	of	 institutions,	 I	 also	 determine	 the	 activities	 that	 support	most	
cooperation	between	farmers	and	the	emergence	of	collective	action.		
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5.3.1	 Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA:	organisational	structure	and	responsibilities	
 
Before	1959,	two	kolkhoz,	Erkin	and	Pravda,	existed	in	the	area	of	the	present	Bek	Abad	
Suu	WUA.	 	 In	1959,	 the	 two	kolkhoz	 united	 to	 form	 the	Erkin	 kolkhoz,	 the	 total	 area	of	
which	was	 4	 006	 hectares	 and	 its	 irrigated	 area	 1	 826	 hectares.	 The	 population	 of	 the	
kolkhoz	 was	 8	 000	 and	 the	members	 of	 the	 farm	 numbered	 3	 500.	 	 The	 kolkhoz	 grew	
cotton,	 tobacco,	 potatoes,	 vegetables,	 grain	 and	 corn.	 	 Production	 and	 cultivation	 was	
organised	 in	 19	 brigades,	 of	 which	 15	 were	 responsible	 for	 cotton	 cultivation	 and	 four	
looked	after	livestock.9			
	
The	present	 irrigation	 system	was	built	during	kolkhoz	 times.	 	 In	1951	and	52,	hydraulic	
work	was	carried	out	on	the	Kara	Darya	River,	to	regulate	the	flow	of	the	river	and	reduce	
the	 chances	 of	 flood.	 	 The	 lined	 canals	 were	 built	 in	 1964.	 	 In	 1959,	 the	 first	 water	
association	 was	 formed	 in	 Bek-Abad,	 made	 up	 of	 water	 specialists	 that	 planned	 and	
executed	water	 distribution.	 	Murabs	 of	 Erkin,	 Zsijde	 and	Munduz	 divided	 the	water	 to	
each	village.10	
	
In	1996,	during	the	midst	of	 the	restructuring	of	 the	agricultural	sector,	 the	kolkhoz	and	
the	shovkoz	were	both	abolished	and	the	agricultural	 lands	 that	once	belonged	to	 them	
were	redistributed	to	individual	farmers.		The	redistribution	created	three	land	categories:	
ülüs	 lands	were	 given	 to	 everyone	 (including	 children)	 alive	 at	 that	 time	 and	 live	 in	 the	
village.	 	 The	 size	 of	 the	 ülüs	 was	 determined	 based	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 arable	 land	 and	
population	numbers	in	each	village.	The	farmers	kept	the	ogorod	lands	that	are	attached	
to	 their	houses.	 	 The	government	also	 set	 aside	 some	 lands	 (Russ.	arenda)	 that	may	be	
rented.			
	
The	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	was	established	on	January	25,	2001,	following	the	closure	of	the	
Erkin	kolkhoz	in	1992.		 Its	 location	relative	to	the	Andijan	Reservoir,	to	the	canals	and	to	
neighbouring	WUAs	 is	shown	on	Map	2.	 	The	area	of	 the	WUA	covers	3	260	hectares,	2	
                                                
9	Author’s	interview	with	the	ex-Chairman	of	the	kolkhoz,	May,	2008.		
10	Author’s	interview	with	the	ex-Chairman	of	the	kolkhoz,	May,	2008.		
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400	independent	farmers	and	17	cooperatives	in	five	villages:	Ücsköcsö-Zsijde,	Bek-Abad,	
Erkin,	Munduz	and	Jani-Jer.			
	
The	source	of	the	water	to	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	is	the	Kara	Darya	off-farm	canal	of	the	
Kara	Daria	River	system.		The	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	service	area	and	its	location	relative	to	
the	waterbodies	of	the	region	is	shown	on	Map	3.		The	number	of	WUA	members	is	2412.		
The	main	crops	are	wheat,	corn,	rice,	cotton,	sunflower	and	vegetables.		The	WUA	has	10	
off-farm	canals	of	51,95	km	in	total.		
	
Within	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	 WUA,	 the	 Board	 (or	 WUA	 Council)	 consists	 of	 11	 members	
elected	by	the	representative	assembly.		The	Chairman	of	WUA	Board	is	not	paid	by	WUA	
and	works	on	voluntary	basis.		WUA	management	consists	of	the	Director,	Accountant,	O	
&	M	Engineer,	cleaner,	guard	and	seven	ditch	riders11.	 	The	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	employs	
four	murabs	(each	being	responsible	for	a	community)	also.		
	
There	 are	 two	 committees	within	 the	 association:	 the	 Revision	 Committee	 (or	 Revision	
Commission)	 and	 the	 Conflict	 Committee	 (or	 Dispute	 Resolution	 Commission).	 	 The	
Revision	 Committee	 consists	 of	 three	 members	 elected	 at	 the	 meeting	 of	 WUA	
representative	 assembly	 for	 three	 years.	 	 The	 Revision	 Committee	 is	 responsible	 for	
inspection	of	accounting	records,	assets,	material	&	technical	reserves	and	bank	accounts	
at	 least	once	a	year.	 	The	Conflict	Committee	consists	of	 five	members	elected	for	three	
years	from	amongst	the	respected	people	whose	opinion	can	influence	opinions	of	other	
WUA	members.	 	On	the	basis	of	 the	result	of	annual	operation	the	WUA	representative	
assembly	decides	to	keep	the	members	of	both	committees	for	the	next	term	or	replace	
by	other	WUA	member.			
	
The	Law	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	on	Unions	(Associations)	of	Water	Users	(2002)	stipulates	
that	 activities	 of	 the	 WUA	 should	 be	 based	 on	 such	 principles	 as	 participative	
                                                
11 Ditch	riders	patrol	and	inspect	irrigation	systems	and	distribute	water.		Murabs	fill	the	same	
responsibilities.		
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management,	fair	and	democratic	decision-making	and	transparency	in	management	and	
the	organisational	 structure	of	 the	WUA	provides	 for	 the	participation	of	 farmers	 in	 the	
decision-making	 processes.	 	 The	 WUA	 Specialist	 of	 the	 OblVodKhoz	 described	 the	
organisational	structure	as	follows:	
	
They	 organisation	 adopted	 a	 new	 organisational	 structure	 based	 on	 the	
experience	 of	 the	 World	 Bank.	 	 The	 organisational	 structure	 has	 changed	
from	 an	 up	 to	 down	 to	 a	 bottom-up	 structure.	 	 Before,	 one	 person,	 the	
Chairman	of	the	kolkhoz,	made	the	decisions.		The	farmers,	at	the	bottom	of	
the	 structure,	 acted	 according	 to	 the	 decisions	 by	 the	Chairman.	 	Now	 the	
decisions	 are	made	 collectively.	 	On	 the	 top	of	 the	 structure	 is	 the	general	
meeting	 (farmers),	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Council	 and	 on	 the	 bottom	 is	 the	
technical	 team.	 	 The	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Council	 (seven	members)	 are	 tasked	
with	 collecting	 water	 fees,	 selecting	 the	 arbitration	 committee	 and	 also	
controlling	 the	services	provided	by	the	technical	 staff.	 	The	technical	 team	
undertakes	maintenance.12	
                                                
12	Author’s	interview	with	the	Water	User	Specialist	of	the	OlbVodKhoz,	July,	2008.		
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Figure	7	 Distribution	infrastructure	at	the	head	of	the	system	
 
Source:	Author	(Summer	2008).		
 
Farmers	become	members	of	the	association	by	signing	a	contract	with	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	
WUA	 and,	 by	 law,	 each	 member	 of	 the	 family,	 under	 whose	 name	 a	 piece	 of	 land	 is	
registered	 is	 also	 its	 member.13	 	 In	 exchange	 for	 payments,	 in	 money	 or	 in	 kind,	 from	
farmers,	 the	 WUA	 distributes	 water	 and	 maintains	 the	 infrastructure.	 	 The	 WUA’s	
responsibility	 consists	 also	 of	 acquiring	water	 from	 the	 supplier	 (a	 government	 agency)	
and	managing	water	distribution	along	 the	 Zsijde-Mazar	distributary	 canal	 and	between	
                                                
13	According	to	the	Law	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	“on	Unions	(Associations)	of	Water	Users”,	“Physical	
or	legal	entity	that	owns	a	plot	of	agricultural	land	situated	within	the	Service	area	of	a	WUA	or	
has	 use	 right	 for	 this	 plot	 of	 agricultural	 land	 for	 the	 term	more	 than	 three	 years	 can	 be	 a	
member	of	WUA.”		In	theory,	this	means	that	each	person	who	received	ülüs	land	is	a	member	
of	the	WUA,	by	law,	if	the	land	is	registered	under	his	or	her	name.		
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networks	 of	 tertiary	 canals.	 	 It	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 repair	 and	 maintenance	 on	 the	
secondary	 and	 tertiary	 levels.	 	 Farmers	 manage	 distribution,	 repair	 and	 maintenance	
within	field-level	canals.			
 
5.3.2	 Irrigation	water	management	under	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	
 
5.3.2.1	Water	delivery	and	distribution		
 
The	 accuracy,	 timeliness	 and	 effectiveness	 depends	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 water,	 the	
demand	of	 various	users,	 the	 capacities	of	 the	 canals	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	measure	 flow	
and	 distribute	water	 according	 to	 the	 demand	 of	 the	 users	 and	 on	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	
operators.	 	 For	 an	 irrigation	 system	 to	 work	 efficiently,	 two	 things	 are	 needed:	
functioning,	 accurate	 and	 reliable	 physical	 structures	 in	 which	 gate	 settings	 can	 be	
adjusted;	and	a	team	of	well-trained	operators	(Bosch	et	al.	1993).	
	
Among	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	WUA	 is	 the	 timely	 delivery	 of	water	 to	members.	 	 To	
distribute	water	on	the	tertiary	level,	four	murabs	meet	each	morning	at	the	head	of	the	
system	to	divide	the	water	among	the	villages.		Later	on	each	allocates	water	among	the	
aryks.		Within	each	aryk,	the	farmers	are	responsible	for	allocating	the	water	by	organising	
taking	turns	in	irrigating	their	fields.			
	
The	allocation	of	water	 in	the	field	runs	 into	difficulties.	 	Due	to	the	dilapidated	state	of	
the	 infrastructure	 except	 perhaps	 for	 the	 conveyance	 system,	 also	 called	 headworks	
(Figure	 7),	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 water	 flow	 measurement	 tools,	 water	 cannot	 be	 accurately	
divided	among	the	tertiary	canals.		In	many	places	along	the	system	the	control	gates	are	
missing.		Each	year	the	WUA	repairs	the	gates,	but	each	year	they	are	broken	to	make	the	
abstraction	of	water	by	farmers	easier.14		This	simple	fact	makes	the	control	of	water	flow	
difficult	at	best,	but	mostly	 impossible.	 	When	asked	about	 the	division	of	water	among	
                                                
14	Author’s	interview	with	Chairman	of	WUA	and	with	WUA	Engineer,	May,	2008.	
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the	villages,	the	murab	 responded	“we	divide	the	water	with	our	eyes”.15	 	This	response	
suggests	little	ability	to	control	water	flow	and	distribution	beyond	the	headworks.		
	
The	murab	is	responsible	for	irrigation	water	management	among	and	in	the	communities	
and	within	the	aryks.	 	The	murab’s	 is	an	ancient	position	that	has	been	recuperated	and	
incorporated	 in	 the	 new	 institutional	 framework.	 	 The	 position	 carries	 with	 it	
responsibilities	 such	 as	 the	 scheduling	 and	 distribution	 of	 water	 among	 the	 aryks	 and	
collecting	 water	 duty.	 	 The	 murab	 is	 the	 employee	 of	 the	 WUAs	 and	 is	 therefore	
answerable	 to	 the	WUA	management	 and	 the	 users.	 	 The	murab	 is	 in	 contact	with	 the	
farmers	each	day	and	is	aware	of	the	water	needs	of	the	community	that	he	is	responsible	
for.	 	Because	of	his	daily	contact	with	people,	he	has	 the	ability	 to	 inspire	adherence	 to	
rules	and	collaboration	among	farmers	in	sharing	irrigation	water.			
	
In	the	study	area,	the	murab	is	not	respected	among	the	people.		As	a	result	of	the	large	
number	of	 farms	that	the	WUA	is	responsible	 for,	 the	 limited	means	of	 the	organisation	
and	the	problems	with	the	infrastructure,	close	and	effective	control	over	distribution	on	
the	level	of	the	farmers	 is	 impossible.	 	Additionally,	the	murab	receives	very	 little	salary.		
The	 position	 frequently	 changes	 hands16	 and	 is	 periodically	 left	 vacant,	 as	 was	 the	
situation	in	Munduz	at	the	time	of	the	research.	 	Finding	a	murab	 is	further	complicated	
by	 some	 cultural	 factors.	 	 Ideally,	 the	murab	 must	 hold	 respect	 among	 farmers	 in	 an	
essentially	traditional	environment.	 	He	or	she	must	show	qualities	such	as	a	certain	age	
(maturity),	endurance	and	respectability.		In	the	words	of	an	interviewee:	
	
The	murabs	 cannot	 […]	 have	 no	 time	 to	 oversee	 the	 distribution	 of	water.		
There	are	many	farmers	you	see,	every	family	is	a	farmer.	[…]	All	the	murabs	
are	young	[…]	older	man	cannot	walk	up	and	down	along	the	canal.	 	That	is	
why	the	older	farmers	do	not	listen	to	the	murab.		They	say:	«	you	are	young,	
                                                
15	Author’s	interview	with	the	Chief	murab	in	May,	2008.		
16	Author’s	interview	with	the	Water	User	Specialist	of	the	OlbVodKhoz,	July,	2008.		
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I	shall	open	the	water	».		And	the	murab	does	not	say	anything,	because	his	
[the	farmer’s]	age	is	his	father’s	age.17	
	
The	WUA	lacks	certain	basic	resources	to	distribute	water	according	to	a	plan	and	to	the	
needs	 of	 the	 users.	 	 Infrastructure	 is	 lacking	 intake	 structures	 and	 gates	 to	 be	 able	 to	
control	water	 flow.	 	There	are	 technological	 lacks	 to	measure	water	 levels	and	calculate	
water	 flow	 at	 various	 points	 of	 the	 canals.	 	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 institutions	 and	
organizations,	 the	 WUA	 is	 lacking	 competent	 operators	 who	 are	 able	 to	 monitor	
distribution,	the	duration	of	 irrigation	by	 individual	 farmers	and	hold	the	authority	vis-a-
vis	the	users	to	settle	any	breach.		
	
The	majority	 of	 interviewees	 reported	 seasonal	 irrigation	water	 shortages.	 	 Seven	 of	 the	
eight	farmers	who	do	not	experience	water	shortages	are	upstream	farmers	(i.e.	closest	to	
the	head	of	 the	canal).	 	Among	the	 interviewees,	27,	who	were	the	most	affected	by	the	
periodic	 water	 shortages,	 lived	 downstream	 (their	 farms	 were	 located	 in	 a	 considerable	
distance	 from	 the	 head	 of	 the	 irrigation	 system).	 	 Therefore,	 the	 geographic	 location	 of	
each	land	in	the	irrigation	system	determined	whether	farmers	would	have	sufficient	water	
or	 not.	 	 This	 situation	 is	 also	 played	out	 on	 the	 larger-scale.	 	While	 Zsijde	 is	 seen	 as	 not	
having	 a	 water	 problem	 (despite	 the	 fact	 some,	 especially	 downstream,	 do	 experience	
water	 shortages)	 Mangut,	 a	 street	 located	 between	 Zsijde,	 Munduz	 and	 Hodjo-Muskui	
(another	 sector	 of	 Zsijde	 that	 is	 situated	downstream	 relative	 to	 Zsijde)	 all	 do.	 	 An	 Elder	
(Kyrg.	 aksakal)	 explained	 well	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 attitudes	 of	 villagers	 toward	 water	
created	by	the	access	(or	its	lack):	
My	neighbours	in	the	Zsijde	village	are	very	lazy,	because	there	is	no	problem	
for	them	with	the	water.		They	go	in	the	morning	and	open	the	canal	as	they	
like,	but	in	Munduz	every	night	5	to	10	men	go	to	guard	the	water.18	
	
Several	factors	contribute	to	irrigation	water	shortages.		Irrigation	water	shortage	is	due	to	
fluctuations	 in	 the	 climate	 and	 to	 a	 dilapidated	 irrigation	 infrastructure.	 	 Cold	winters	 in	
                                                
17	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Munduz,	June,	2008.		
18	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Zsijde,	June,	2008.		
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2007	and	2008	resulted	in	a	situation	where	the	extensive	use	of	hydropower	for	heating	
resulted	in	very	low	levels	of	waters	in	the	Syr	Darya	for	the	irrigation	season	(Libert	2008).		
The	 representative	 of	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 confirmed	 that	 in	 2008,	 one	 third	 of	 the	
amount	of	irrigation	water	was	available	compared	to	other	years.19		Due	to	the	dilapidated	
irrigation	infrastructure,	there	is	also	much	loss	of	water	in	the	system.		Officially,	about	20	
per	 cent	of	 the	water	 that	 is	allocated	 through	 the	main	canal	 is	 lost	due	 to	evaporation	
and	leakage,	but	some	interlocutors,	 including	 irrigation	officials,	estimate	this	number	to	
be	much	higher.			
	
On	 the	 demand	 side,	 some	 interlocutors,	 farmers	 as	 well	 as	 professionals,	 are	 of	 the	
opinion	that	the	increased	cultivation	of	rice	in	the	area	is	causing	water	shortages.		Since	
the	introduction	of	rice	cultivation	on	350	hectares	in	199020,	cultivation	expanded	to	490	
hectares	 in	 2006	 and	 to	 560	 hectares	 in	 2007.	 	 According	 to	 figures	 4	 and	 5,	 the	 most	
commonly	grown	crop	is	rice.		However,	as	the	following	interview	segment	with	the	Head	
of	Water	Unit	of	the	RayVodKhoz	demonstrate	the	difficulties	in	determining	the	accurate	
number	of	hectares	on	which	rice	 is	cultivated	and	that	the	total	hectare	of	rice	grown	is	
likely	to	be	higher	than	the	numbers	published	by	the	RayVodKhoz:	
After	the	independence,	the	farmers	put	crops	as	they	wished.		People	say	
that	 they	grow	a	number	of	hectares	of	 rice	but,	 in	reality,	 they	will	plant	
more.		In	the	whole	Suzak	there	is	1	700	hectares	of	rice,	but	in	reality	there	
are	 more	 than	 2	 000	 hectares	 of	 rice.	 	 People	 lie.	 They	 put	 rice	 on	 one	
hectare,	but	they	say	that	they	planted	50	or	20	sotiks.		People	want	to	pay	
less	money.21	
	
Rice	is	a	water	intensive	crop,	needing	seven	times	as	much	water	as	grain	and	four	times	
as	much	 as	 corn.	 	While	 these	 latter	 crops	 require	 irrigation	 several	 times	 per	 year,	 rice	
needs	 to	 be	 cultivated	 in	water,	 and	 cannot	 survive	 extended	 periods	without	 irrigation.		
                                                
19	Author’s	interview	in	May	2008,	with	the	Bek-Abad	Suu	WUA’s	Engineer.	
20	Author’s	interview	with	the	ex-Chairman	of	the	kolkhoz,	May,	2008.		
21	Author’s	interview	with	the	Head	of	Water	Unit,	RaiVodKhoz,	July,	2008.		
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Because	it	needs	such	large	amounts	of	water,	the	preparation	for	the	rice-plots	by	all	the	
farmers	before	the	planting	stage	in	the	spring	creates	periodic	water	scarcities.		Although,	
when	asked,	 the	Chief	murab	 said	 that	 the	 reason	 for	water	 shortage	 is	 the	bad	 state	of	
tastructure,	he	did	admit	that	the	rice-growing	was	the	cause	of	periodic	bottlenecks:	
After	 the	 repairing	of	canal	 there	 is	 little	problem.	 	When	rice	and	cotton	
are	being	grown,	people	ask	for	much	water.		After	the	rice	growing,	there	
is	little	demand	for	water.22			
	
The	fact	that	members	of	the	WUA	do	not	give	real	 information	of	the	amount	of	crops	
they	grow,	the	WUA	is	unable	to	gain	and	provide	to	the	government	agencies	a	realistic	
picture	of	 the	water	needs.	 	 It	also	has	budgetary	consequences.	 	 Farmers	under-report	
the	amount	of	crops	and	pay	less	for	water	to	the	WUA.		
 
5.3.2.2	Dispute	resolution		
 
 The	 inefficiencies	 of	 the	 physical	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 management	 and	
supervision	by	the	murab	below	the	level	of	the	aryk	and	on	the	level	of	individual	farmer	
create	 a	 situation	 where	 quarrels	 and	 fights	 over	 water	 are	 frequent	 and	 free-riding	
frequently	occurs.	 	 I	observed	many	 times	users	 standing	guard	at	 the	abstraction	point	
(the	 point	 where	water	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 the	 canal)	 in	 Zsijde	 (for	Munduz	 and	 Hodjo	
Muskui)	and	manipulating	the	flow	of	the	water	with	a	stone.	 	There	are	arguments	and	
usually	the	older	or	stronger	wins.		An	interviewee	demonstrated	how,	in	order	to	water	
his	 land,	 he	 makes	 holes	 in	 the	 lined	 canal	 to	 be	 able	 to	 abstract	 water	 at	 night.	 	 In	
another	 case,	a	 farmer,	owner	of	 several	hectares,	admitted	not	paying	 to	 the	WUA	 for	
the	water	that	he	uses	from	the	irrigation	system.			
	
The	structure	and	regulations	of	the	WUA	provide	for	dispute	resolution	and	punishment	
for	free-riding	and	stealing	water.		According	to	the	regulations	of	the	WUA,	an	arbitration	
committee,	made	up	of	five	people	that	are	chosen	by	the	members	of	the	WUA,	resolves	
any	 disputes.	 	 These	 are	aksakals,	 one	 from	each	 village.	 	 If	 they	 are	 not	 available,	 the	
                                                
22	Author’s	interview	with	the	Chief	murab	in	May,	2008.		
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chief	 of	 the	 WUA	 becomes	 the	 decision-maker.23	 	 Punishment	 is	 given	 for	 damaging	
infrastructure	 such	 as	 breaking	 the	 canals	 or	 making	 holes	 in	 their	 walls.	 	 Those	 who	
commit	 offences	 may	 receive	 a	 monetary	 punishment24	 or	 the	 WUA	 has	 the	 right	 to	
withhold	water	between	three	and	ten	days25.			Despite	the	existence	of	these	measures,	
it	is	very	difficult	to	enforce	them.		The	reason	for	the	institutional	weakness	of	the	WUA	
is	that	it	lacks	the	financial	capacities	to	hire	enough	personnel.		As	I	was	told:		
	
Disputes	 over	 water	 and	 breaches	 are	 hardy	 ever	 reported	 to	 the	 WUA.	 	 One	 of	 the	
reasons	 concern	 the	 definition	 of	 stealing	 and	 how	 various	 actors	 within	 the	 system	
conceive	of	it.		As	the	following	citation	shows,	free-riding	is	not	necessarily	perceived	as	
stealing:	
“I	do	not	think	that	it	is	stealing.		Stealing	is	when	I	have	my	own	water	and	
somebody	 takes	 it	without	my	permission.	 	The	water	 is	a	 common.	 	All	of	
them	may	use	the	water.”26	
	
The	 above	 quotation	 highlights	 the	 issues	 around	 the	 definitions	 of	 water	 rights	 and	
access.	 	While	 for	 the	WUA	 leaders,	 rights	of	access	are	associated	with	membership	 in	
and	 payments	 for	 water,	 for	 the	 users	 the	 right	 to	 access	 irrigation	 water	 is	 strongly	
associated	with	land	rights	but	it	is	dissociated	from	being	a	member	of	the	WUA.		In	fact,	
most	 farmers	 believe	 that	 water	 is	 a	 free	 and	 common	 resource.	 	 The	 following	
conversation	demonstrates	well	this	attitude:	
Who	has	 the	 right	 to	use	 irrigation	water?	 	 Everybody	has	 the	 right	 to	use	
irrigation	water.	 	Even	those	who	do	not	pay?	 	Yes.	 	You	see	the	use	of	the	
water	is	free	of	charge.		The	people	will	pay	money	for	the	WUA	to	repair	the	
                                                
23	Author’s	interview	with	Chairman	of	WUA	and	with	WUA	Engineer,	May,	2008.		
24	Author’s	interview	with	WUA	Engineer,	May,	2008.		
25	Author’s	interview	with	Chairman	of	WUA,	May,	2008.		
26	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Munduz,	June,	2008.	
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canals.	 […]	 	 In	the	Kyrgyz	 law	it	 is	said	that	water	 is	 free.	 	For	example,	this	
year	I	may	not	pay	the	money	for	water,	because	there	were	no	repairs.27	
	
A	 similar	 situation	 arises	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 arbitration	 committee	 and	 the	 WUAs	
punishment	mechanisms.	 	 Interviewees	were	not	aware	of	them	and	they	tended	not	to	
report	problems	regarding	stealing	and	free-riding	to	the	WUA.		If	there	was	an	attempt	to	
resolve	a	dispute,	users	preferred	 to	do	so	between	 themselves	and	 to	save	 face.	 	They	
relied	on	such	social	sanctions	as	shaming	rather	than	turning	to	formal	institutions	such	
as	the	arbitration	committee.		In	the	words	of	the	Chief	murab:	
The	 law	 foresees	 the	 punishment	 of	 people	 who	 steal	 water.	 	 But	 in	 the	
community	all	the	people	who	steal	water	are	acquaintances.		Therefore,	the	
law	is	not	applied.		I	shame	people	who	steal	water.28	
	
Clearly,	even	if	the	WUA	foresees	a	water	schedule	and	the	member	farmers	are	expected	
to	comply,	these	schedules,	 in	most	cases,	cannot	and	aren’t	enforced	by	the	WUA	with	
user	farmers.		In	the	case	of	the	study	area,	free-riding	is	a	“rule”,	an	institution	in	itself.		
In	addition,	while	in	a	formal	organization,	such	as	the	WUA,	punishment	is	expressed	in	
fines,	in	a	closely	knit	community	punishment	would	be	expressed	in	“shaming”.			
 
5.3.3	 Informal	institutions	
 
There	is	an	institutional	vacuum	between	the	administration	of	the	WUA	and	the	tertiary	
canals	 and	 the	 farmers’	 fields.	 	 The	 vacuum	 is	 filled	 with	 informal	 institutions	 and	
spontaneous	 cooperation	 that	mostly	 arise	 in	 response	 to	 water	 scarcity.	 	 Examples	 of	
cooperation	 exist	 in	 the	 form	 of	 organizing	 distribution	 and	monitoring	 of	water	within	
farmers	along	an	aryk.		Especially	during	peak	irrigation	season	when	water	shortages	are	
experienced,	farmers	in	an	aryk	agree	to	‘take	turns’.		This	kind	of	cooperation	works	well	
within	the	framework	of	the	WUA	as	the	farmers	are	responsible	for	scheduling	irrigation	
in	the	fields.		However,	in	some	cases,	when	they	feel	that	others	threaten	their	supply	of	
                                                
27	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Munduz,	June,	2008.		
28	Author’s	interview	with	Chairman	of	WUA,	May,	2008.		
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water,	they	monitor	the	water	together	at	the	tertiary	canal,	which	is	under	the	murab’s	
supervision.	 	 The	 situation	 of	 the	 farmers	 of	 Hodzso-Muskui,	 a	 part	 of	 Zsijde,	 is	 a	 good	
example	of	 such	 informal	 collective	action.	 	Hodzso-Muskui,	 competes	with	Munduz	 for	
water.	 	As	a	result	of	water	shortages,	farmers	show	more	willingness	than	other	groups	
of	 farmers	 in	 further	 upstream	 in	 the	 study	 area	 to	 invest	 time	 and	manpower	 and	 act	
collectively	to	abstract	and	guard	water.		One	interlocutor	explained	the	management	of	
irrigation	among	the	farmers	as	follows:	
We	use	water	in	turn.		We	start	taking	water	at	night	and	we	will	take	it	for	
two	days.		[Who	decided	that	you	could	take	water?]		We	decide	ourselves.		
There	is	no	murab.	 	[…]		We	guard	the	water,	two	men	at	the	beginning	[at	
the	abstraction	point],	two	men	in	the	middle	and	two	men	at	the	end.		We	
guard	 it	 at	 the	 lined	 canal.	 	 We	 agree	 to	 guard	 the	 water	 from	 Zsijde’s	
villagers.29	
	
While	taking	turn	among	the	farmers	 in	aryks	frequently	happens,	guarding	the	water	 in	
such	an	organized	manner	is	more	of	an	exception	than	a	rule.		Usually,	people	will	guard	
their	water	 individually,	spending	much	time	monitoring	the	abstraction	point	as	well	as	
their	field.			
	
Ashar	has	been	an	 institution	of	collective	action	 for	 long	a	 long	 time.	 	 It	 is	a	pre-Soviet	
Central	Asian	custom,	probably	of	Uzbek	origin,	and	the	Kyrgyz	strongly	identify	with	it.		In	
the	 framework	 of	 the	 ashar,	 community	members	 are	 called	 together	 to	 build	 houses,	
harvest	 crops	 and	 undertake	 charity	 work	 (helping	 widows	 for	 example).	 	 During	 the	
Soviet	period,	paid	work	replaced	ashar	 in	 the	 fields.	 	Nonetheless,	people	continued	to	
practice	the	custom	outside	the	kolkhoz,	mainly	in	houses	construction.		In	some	cases,	in	
the	Soviet	era	kolkhoz,	workers	were	required	to	work	on	the	repair	and	maintenance	of	
the	 canal.	 	 Participation	 was	 paid	 and	 it	 was	 obligatory:	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 kolkhoz	
punished	whoever	did	not	participate	in	the	ashar30.		
	
                                                
29	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Munduz,	June,	2008.		
30	Author’s	interview	with	habitant	of	Zsijde,	May,	2008.		
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Today,	ashar	is	frequently	used	in	repair	and	maintenance	of	the	irrigation	infrastructure.		
Both	 the	 concrete	 canal	 and	 the	 field-	 level	 canals	 are	 repaired	 using	ashar.	 	 The	WUA	
maintains	 the	 concrete	 canal.	 	 The	 head	 of	 the	 local	 government	 and	 the	 Chair	 of	 the	
association	determine	what	 repairs	will	 take	place,	where	and	when.	 	 To	undertake	 the	
yearly	 rehabilitation	of	main	canals,	 in	addition	to	 the	WUA’s	employees,	 it	 requires	 the	
labour	of	some	ten	farmers.		On	the	field	canals,	repair	is	organized	among	the	farmers.31		
	
Although	ashar	remains	common	practice	today,	it	has	gone	through	considerable	change,	
especially	 since	 independence.	 	Firstly,	while	pre-Soviet	ashar	was	organized	 to	 support	
families,	 there	 is	 a	 decrease	 in	 family-oriented	ashar	 today.	 	 Instead,	 people,	 or	 rather	
families,	 who	 need	 work	 done,	 hire	 workers	 to	 do	 those	 tasks	 that	 used	 to	 be	
accomplished	 communally.	 	 Secondly,	 people	 today	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 provide	 their	 time	
and	 labour	 for	others	 free.	 	 Interviewees	explained	this	change	to	me	as	 follows:	 	Ashar	
used	 to	 be	 (during	 the	 Soviet	 era)	 a	 way	 of	 life	 in	 which	 “everybody	 would	 help	
everybody”32,	(meaning	that	the	whole	village	was	invited).		Today,	however,	the	circle	of	
those	 to	 be	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 an	 ashar	 is	 limited	 to	 those	 that	 one	 has	 good	
relations	with.		People	invite	relatives,	friends	and	neighbours	for	building	houses	and	for	
harvests.	 	 Some	 interviewees	 attributed	 this	 to	 the	 fact	 that	people	 are	 richer	now	and	
they	 exhibit	 increasingly	 individualistic	 behaviours.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	
increasingly	diversified	livelihoods	and	with	outmigration	for	work,	the	capacity	of	a	family	
to	participate	in	ashar	is	somewhat	reduced.		
	
Earle	 et	 al.	 (no	 date)	 writes	 that	 while	 community	 assistance	 for	 single	 families	 is	
becoming	 rare,	 ‘communal’	 ashar,	 in	 which	 the	 whole	 community	 comes	 together	 to	
undertake	 the	 construction	 or	 repair	 of	 communal	 infrastructure	 is	 becoming	 more	
common.		Nowhere	this	is	more	apparent	than	in	irrigation.		In	each	of	the	communities	
that	 I	studied,	ashar	 is	used	to	clean	and	repair	the	aryks	each	spring,	 in	preparation	for	
the	growing	season.		During	Soviet	times,	the	kolkhoz	would	pay	workers	(the	members	of	
brigades)	to	repair	the	canals.	 	Farmers,	frequently	ex-members	of	the	kolkhoz,	continue	
                                                
31	Author’s	interview	with	Chairman	of	WUA,	May,	2008.	
32	Author’s	interview	with	resident	of	Jarti	Bash,	June,	2008.		
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to	 undertake	 this	work,	 free	 of	 charge,	 since	 the	 government	 (through	 the	kolkhoz)	 no	
longer	provides	payment	for	the	work.		
	
Interviewees	 agreed	 that	 the	 impetus	 to	 call	 an	 ashar	 is	 not	 a	 collective	 decision	 of	 a	
community	of	the	users.		Rather,	the	leading	members	of	the	community,	the	ail	baschi	or	
the	aksakals	will	mobilize	people	 for	 the	ashar	 and	 it	 is	 their	 responsibility	 to	distribute	
the	work	among	the	farmers.	 	While	 it	 isn’t	communally	generated,	people	regard	ashar	
as	 their	 traditional	 custom	 and	 part	 of	 their	 collective	 identity.	 	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 for	 that	
reason,	once	ashar	is	called,	everyone	I	interviewed	seems	to	comply.	
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Chapter	6		 Conclusions		
	
In	 1991,	 the	 newly	 independent	 Kyrgyzstan	 inherited	 from	 the	 past	 an	 irrigation	
infrastructure	 that	 had	 fallen	 into	 despair,	 limited	 financial	 means	 and	 professional	
capabilities	and	a	hierarchical	governance	system	in	irrigation	that	no	longer	matched	the	
needs	of	 the	millions	of	 small	 landowners.	 	The	development	path	 that	 the	government	
set	 out	 on	 was	 guided	 by	 international	 policy	 discourse	 and	 donors	 saw	 the	
decentralization	 of	 irrigation	 management	 and	 the	 devolution	 of	 responsibilities	 for	
irrigation	 management	 to	 the	 users	 within	 the	 Water	 User	 Associations	 institutional	
structure.			
	
In	the	research	area,	the	Bek	Abad	Suu	WUA	is	the	formal	organization	that	is	responsible	
for	 the	management	of	 the	 irrigation	 system.	 	 Introduced	based	on	a	generic	model	 for	
WUAs,	it	has	a	set	organizational	structure,	clearly	defined	rules	and	responsibilities	and	a	
membership	 that	 is	made	 up	 of	 the	water	 users	 in	 the	 research	 area.	 	 The	WUA	 holds	
distribution	rights,	 rights	 to	collect	 fees	 for	water	delivery,	 to	settle	disputes	and	to	 fine	
free	riders.		Success	in	fulfilling	the	responsibilities	of	the	WUA	means	providing	water	on	
time	and	in	sufficient	quantities	over	a	period	of	time	and	at	a	reasonable	cost	(from	the	
perspective	of	 the	farmer).	 	 IMT	also	 implies	assuming	responsibility	 for	management	of	
the	 infrastructure,	 including	 operation	 and	 maintenance,	 and	 the	 participation	 of	 the	
irrigators,	specifically	in	cooperating	in	tertiary	and	on-farm	irrigation	and	supporting	the	
Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 in	 repair	 and	maintenance.	 	 Here	 collective	 action	 by	 the	 users	 is	
essential.		
	
The	 findings	 of	 the	 study	 reveal	 that	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 is	 unable	 to	 successfully	
manage	 supply	 and	 distribution.	 	 A	 good	 example	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 accurate	 data	 on	 the	
number	of	hectares	of	rice	and	other	crops	do	not	exist,	making	it	impossible	for	the	WUA	
to	 calculate	 the	 amount	 of	 water	 needed	 for	 the	 season.	 	 It	 is	 also	 unable	 to	 plan	 a	
cropping	calendar	that	would	also	provide	information	to	the	farmers	about	the	amounts	
of	water	that	they	may	expect	to	receive.		Aside	from	the	deteriorated	infrastructure	the	
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repair	of	which	the	WUA	cannot	 fund	-	 the	water	 fee	collected	 from	members	does	not	
cover	 the	 repair	 of	 such	 complex	 system	 –	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 human	 resources	 to	
oversee	distribution.		From	the	perspective	of	dispute	resolution,	it	clearly	falls	outside	of	
boundaries	of	the	traditional	culture	within	which	disputes	are	settled.			
	
The	 case	 study	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 Bek	 Abad	 Suu	WUA	 does	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	
inspire	collective	action.		Users	have	very	limited	participation	in	the	work	of	the	WUA	and	
in	decision-making.		The	WUA	remains	isolated	from	the	users	in	the	everyday	practice	of	
irrigation	water	management.		This	isolation	is	most	apparent	in	the	way	users	understand	
water	 rights	 and	 regulations	 regarding	 fines	 and	 punishment.	 	 The	 cause	 may	 be	 that,	
during	 Soviet	 time	 there	 was	 very	 little	 opportunity	 for	 decision-making	 within	 the	
prevailing	institutional	and	organisational	frameworks.		It	may	also	be	that,	farmers	do	not	
have	an	incentive	to	participate	in	the	work	of	the	WUA	as	they	feel	that	the	WUA,	due	to	
lack	 of	 resources	 is	 unable	 to	 fulfil	 its	 responsibility	 towards	 them:	 to	 provide	 a	 timely,	
equitable	as	sufficient	water.		
	
The	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	emergence	of	 collective	action	are	numerous.	 	Among	 the	
most	important	are	factors	are	the	strong	interest	in	the	resource,	mutual	vulnerability,	the	
presence	of	social	capital,	negligible	differences	in	socio-economic	conditions	and	effective	
local	 leadership	 that	 also	 have	 the	 trust	 of	 community	members.	 	 In	 the	 research	 area,	
collective	 action	 by	 the	members	 of	 the	WUA	 is	 lacking.	 	 Farmers	 lack	 understanding	 of	
their	 new	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 vis-à-vis	 the	 WUA	 and	 a	 wish	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	
management	of	irrigation	water	through	the	new	institutional	structure	that	is	provided	for	
them.	 	 Rather,	 they	 mutually	 experience	 a	 water	 scarcity	 and	 need	 to	 acquire	 water.		
Mostly,	 collective	 action,	 if	 it	 happens,	 it	 happens	 outside	 the	 formal	 structures	 of	 the	
WUA,	mostly	spontaneously	and	to	defend	what	is	regarded	by	farmers	along	the	various	
canal	as	common	interest	–	irrigation	water.		
	
Much	time	has	passed	since	 the	 fieldwork	 for	 this	 research	and	there	are	numerous	new	
questions	 arising	 about	 irrigation	 institutions	 in	 the	 Syr	 Darya	 River	 basin.	 	 While	 this	
research	 found	 evidence	 of	 informal	 groups	 of	 farmers	 acting	 together	 to	 defend	 their	
interest,	 Moss	 and	 Hamidov	 (2016)	 observes	 the	 emergence	 of	 more	 organised	 WUGs.		
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One	 line	 of	 enquiry	 worthwhile	 pursuing	 is	 the	 evolution	 of	 WUAs	 in	 the	 irrigated	
agriculture	 landscape	of	 the	Ferghana	Valley.	 	Another	question	 is	whether	 the	groups	of	
users,	 informally	 organized	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 research,	 have	 further	 evolved	 into	more	
structured	 institutions	or	 into	other	directions.	 	 If	 so,	 do	 they	 fit	 in	 the	prevailing	 formal	
structure	of	basin	institutions	and	have	representation	vis-à-vis	the	WUAs?		Do	remain	and	
act	at	the	fringes	of	formal	network?		How	do	their	existence	and	actions	influence	water	
management?		In	this	landscape,	ideas	around	boundary	spanners	and	the	role	of	trust	are	
worthwhile	topics	of	further	research.		
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INTERVIEW	GUIDE	
 
 
Name		______________________	
	
Gender	_____________________	
	
Personal	Information		
What	is	your	age?			
What	is	your	ethnicity?		
What	is	your	religion?		
Where	were	you	born?	
That	is	where	your	mother/father	was	born?	 		
If	answer	to	question	above	is	«	somewhere	else	»:		When	did	you	move	here?		
Do	you	live	alone?	 	 	 	
If	no,	who	else	lives	in	the	same	house		(belongs	to	the	same	cooking	pot)?	
	
The	Land		
Do	you	and	your	family	own/rent	agricultural	land?	 	 Own/Lease/None	
How	much	land	do	you	and	your	family	own/rent	and	what	type	of	land?		
Where	are	is/are	your	land(s)	located?		
How	is	the	land	divided	within	your	family?	
Since	when	do	you	own/rent	this	land?	 	 					
How	did	you	receive	your	land?	
How	many	months	per	year	are	you	farming?			
Which	crops	and	when?		
Do	you	farm	alone	or	together	with	family	or	other	farmers?			 	
If	together	with	family	or	other	farmers,	how	do	you	divide	the	work		
on	the	land	(who	does	what)?	
	
Livelihood	Strategies	
Do	you	only	work	as	a	farmer	or	do	you	have	other	employment?	 	
 	 80	
Do	other	members	of	your	family	work	only	as	a	farmer	or	do	they	have	other	sources	of	
incomes?	 	 	 	 	
Do	you	market	your	produce?		 Which	and	Where?			
	
Irrigation	Water		
Do	the	crops	(kitchen	or	field)	require	irrigation?	 	 Yes/No		
Who	is	responsible	for	managing	irrigation	water	on	your	land(s)?			
From	which	canal	do	you	get	your	water?	
During	which	months	of	the	year	do	you	irrigate?		
Which	crops?		
Do	you	experience	irrigation	water	shortage?	 	 Yes/No	
During	which	months?	
What,	in	your	opinion,	causes	irrigation	water	shortage?		
In	the	past	(during	the	Soviet	period),	did	you	experience	water	shortage	often?	
	
Alternative	Water	Supply		
Do	 you	 use	 other	 sources	 of	water	 to	 irrigate	 your	 field	 than	 the	 one	 available	 directly	
from	the	canal?		
	
De	facto	water	rights		
Who	has	the	right	to	use	irrigation	water?	
How	much	irrigation	water	do	you	have	the	right	to	use?	
How	many	soms	do	you	pay	per	year?	
	
Irrigation	Institutions	-	Distribution	 	
How	is	distribution	organized	among	farmers	who	have	lands	along	the	canal?	
Is	there	water	scarcity	this	year?		 Yes/No	
How	is	distribution	different	during	times	of	scarcity?	
Who	decides	about	the	distribution	of	irrigation	water?	
Do	 you	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 about	 irrigation	 water	 distribution?
	 Why?/Why	not?	
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Do	you	monitor	water	distribution?	 Yes/No	 	 If	yes,	how?	
How	are	the	disputes	settled?		By	which	person(s)	or	organisation(s)?	
How	are	people	who	steal	water	punished?	
Was	the	system	managed	differently	during	Soviet	times?			 	
	
Maintenance	Institutions	
How	are	canal	repairs	organized	among	farmers	who	have	lands	along	the	canal?	
Which	person(s)	or	organisation(s)	organizes	canal	repairs?	
Do	you	participate	in	deciding	when/how	to	make	reparations?			
Do	you	participate	in	canal	repairs?			
How	are	disputes	among	farmers	about	maintenance	resolved?		
By	which	person(s)	or	organisation(s)?	
How	was	maintenance	organized	during	Soviet	times?	
	
Cooperation	
What	is	ashar?	 	
For	what	purpose	is	ashar	organized?	
Is	ashar	organized	for	the	reparation	of	the	irrigation	system?		How	is	it	done?	
How	often	is	ashar	organized?		
Who	organizes	it?	
Do	you	participate	in	the	ashar?	 	 	
Do	you	participate	voluntarily	or	are	you	obliged	to	do	so?	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Voluntarily/Obliged		
	
Other	Institutions	
Are	you	a	member	of	a	Water	User	Association?		 	 Yes/No	
How	does	the	Water	User	Association	organize	irrigation	water		
distribution	and	the	reparations	of	canals?	
How	do	you	participate	in	the	work	of	the	Water	User	Association?	
What	other	ways	exist	for	organizing	together	water	distribution	and	canal		
repairs	among	farmers?	
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How	did	people	organize	irrigation	and	drainage	maintenance	during	Soviet	times?	
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CONSENT	FORM	
 
Research	Title:	 Institutions	and	“Collective	Action”	in	a	Transitional	Country	
Context:	Managing	Water	Resources	in	the	Syr	Darya	River	Basin	
Researcher:			 	Blanka	 Füleki,	 Graduate	 Student,	 Département	 de	 Géographie,	
Université	de	Montréal	
Director:		 	Thora	 Martina	 Herrmann,	 Professor	 Adjoint,	 Département	 de	
Géographie,	Université	de	Montréal	
Co-Director:	 	Patricia	 Martin,	 Professor	 Adjoint,	 Département	 de	 Géographie,	
Université	de	Montréal	
	
The	following	questionnaire	is	a	part	of	a	research	project	to	evaluate	the	role	of	
collective	action	in	the	local	level	management	of	an	irrigation	and	drainage	system	in	the	
Syr	Darya	River	basin	in	the	Ferghana	Valley.		The	research	project	seeks	to	(1)	understand	
the	 importance	 of	 irrigated	water	 to	 local	 livelihoods	 in	 the	 research	 area,	 (2)	 describe	
formal	 and	 informal	 institutions	 through	 which	 farmers	 manage	 irrigation	 &	 drainage	
systems,	 and	 (3)	 determine	 which	 characteristics	 of	 the	 institutions	 support	 collective	
action	and	which	characteristics	inhibit	its	development.	
	
Your	participation	 in	 this	 research	will	consist	of	 responding	to	certain	questions	
about	 the	 way	 irrigation	 water	 and	 the	 drainage	 systems	 are	 managed	 within	 your	
community.	
	
Through	participating	in	this	research,	you	will	contribute	to	the	understanding	of	
community	water	management	 in	 transitional	 countries.	 	 	 This	project	and	 the	methods	
chosen	to	collect	data	does	not	result	in	any	inconvenience	and	benefit	to	you.		
	
Please	 be	 aware	 that	 your	 participation	 is	 entirely	 voluntary.	 You	 are	 under	 no	
obligation	 to	answer	any	of	 the	 following	questions,	and	may	request	 to	withdraw	from	
our	study	at	any	point	without	explaining	your	withdrawal.		If	you	wish	to	withdraw	from	
the	research	or	wish	to	report	a	complaint	related	to	the	research,	you	may	contact	the	
Research	 Director	 by	 phone	 or	 email.	 	 Her	 telephone	 number	 and	 email	 address	 are	
indicated	below.		
	
This	project	and	the	methods	chosen	to	collect	data	do	not	result	in	any	personal	
benefit	 to	 you	 and	 the	 only	 inconvenience	 is	 the	 time	 required	 for	 the	 interview	 (an	
average	 of	 an	 hour	 to	 an	 hour	 and	 a	 half,	 or	 longer	 if	 you	 so	wish).	 	 Upon	 signing	 the	
Consent	Form,	you	will	receive	a	copy	of	it.			
	
Your	responses	will	remain	confidential.	 	Each	participant	will	be	given	a	number	
and	only	 the	 researcher	will	have	a	 list	 containing	 the	name	of	 the	participants	and	 the	
corresponding	numbers.	 	None	of	 the	 information	 that	would	permit	 your	 identification	
will	be	published.		Personal	information	that	would	allow	any	identification	will	be	kept	in	
a	locked	cabinet	and	destroyed	7	(seven)	years	after	the	end	of	the	project.			
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CONSENT	
	
I	 declare	 that	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 Consent	 Form,	 that	 I	 received	
satisfactory	responses	to	my	questions	about	my	participation	 in	the	research	and	that	 I	
understand	 the	goal	of	 the	 research	as	well	as	 the	nature,	 the	advantages	and	 the	 risks	
related	to	my	participation	in	it.	
	
Following	consideration,	I	agree	freely	to	participate	in	the	research.		I	am	aware	
of	 my	 right	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 study	 at	 any	 point	 without	 giving	 a	 reason	 for	
withdrawal.	
	
Signature:		_________________________			 	 Date:		
_________________________	
Name	 in	 print	 (First	 Name/Family	 Name):	 	 _________________________________	
_________	
I	declare	that	I	explained	to	the	participant	the	goal	of	the	research,	the	nature	of	
his/her	 participation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 advantages	 and	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 his/her	
participation	 in	 the	 research.	 	 I	 answered	 to	 his/her	 questions	 to	 the	 best	 of	 my	
knowledge.	
		
Signature	 of	 the	 Researcher:	 	 ___________________	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Date:		
________________________	
You	may	communicate	your	questions	about	the	research	as	well	as	your	decision	
to	withdraw	from	the	research	to	my	translator,	[name	of	translater]	at	[phone	number	of	
translator].	
	
All	complaints	related	to	the	research	can	be	communicated	to	the	ombudsman	of	
the	 Université	 de	 Montréal,	 at	 1	 (514)	 343-2100,	 or	 by	 writing	 to	
ombudsman@umontreal.ca	(The	ombudsman	accepts	collect	calls).	
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